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Jinyan Li*

The Great Fiscal Wall of China: Tax Treaties
and Their Role in Defining and Defending
China’s Tax Base
By taking the Great Wall of China as an analogy
for China’s treaty policy, the author considers
key aspects of China’s treaty network and its
implications, and whether or not this constitutes
a “Great Fiscal Wall of China”.
1. Introduction
The Great Wall is an iconic symbol of China. As a manmade structure, the Great Wall functioned historically as a
practical tool of defence and territorial claims. As a symbol
of China, the Great Wall may mean different things to different people, ranging from a symbol of Chinese national
identity to a witness to “a history of cultural encounters
that have shaped modern ideas about China within the
country as well as outside”.1 At the risk of oversimplification, this article argues that the network of tax treaties
functions as the Great Fiscal Wall of China, with each
tax treaty forming the network as a point of encounter
between the Chinese and foreign tax systems, defining the
boundaries of the Chinese tax base (as well as the treaty
partner’s) and defending such tax base through various
anti-abuse rules. Although each tax treaty is different in
some respects, the network as a whole reveals some characteristics that arguably give shape to a distinct Chinese
identity in treaty policy.
The analogy of the treaty network to the Great Wall has
its limitations. Unlike the Great Wall, tax treaties are not a
“Chinese creation”. China must adopt the design and technology developed elsewhere with limited room for modification. More fundamentally, the people on the other
side of the Great Wall were “outsiders” or “enemies”, but
the party on the other side of a tax treaty is a “partner”. In
addition, unlike the Great Wall, which was not intended
to benefit any private citizens directly, tax treaties are
designed to provide relief to taxpayers. An interesting
twist is that taxpayers can also use the fiscal wall to shield
their income from Chinese taxation. Metaphorically
speaking, the fiscal wall has gates for cross-border fiscal
travellers who can use (or abuse) a tax treaty.
*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Canada. The
author can be contacted at JinyanLi@osgoode.yorku.ca.

1.

C.C. Huang, Deconstructing the Great Wall of China: The Jesuits’ and British
Encounters, in History in the Making, vol. 1, no. 165, p. 66 (2012), available
at www.historyitm.org/index.php/hitm/article/view/76). For further
study of the Great Wall, see J. Lovell, The Great Wall: China Against the
World, 1000 BC – 2000 AD (Pan Macmillan Austrl. Pty, Ltd. 2007) and
A. Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge
U. Press 1990).
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In spite of the limitations in analogizing the treaty
network as the Great Wall, such an approach serves a
useful purpose in this article. Following this introduction, section 2. describes the development of the Great
Fiscal Wall over the past three decades, China’s motivation for entering into tax treaties and the influence of the
OECD Model2 and UN Model.3 Section 3. discusses the
personal scope of tax treaties, i.e. the meaning of resident
of a contracting state. Section 4. examines the substantive
rules that define the scope of source-based tax jurisdiction
over business profits, passive income (dividends, interest
and royalties), capital gains and personal services. Section
5. discusses the use of tax treaties as a defence mechanism
and examines the design and application of various antiabuse rules. Sections 4. and 5. consider not only the provisions of tax treaties, but also the administrative policy and
practice of Chinese tax authorities. On the basis of a study
of selected tax treaties, section 6. identifies some major
trends in China’s treaty policy. The article concludes by
noting some distinguishing features of the Great Fiscal
Wall of China and speculates the implications for China
and its treaty partners and cross-border investors. As this
article focuses on the role of tax treaties in defining and
defending China’s tax base, it does not discuss in any detail
the “special provisions”, i.e. non-discrimination, mutual
agreement procedure, exchange of information, assistance in the collection of taxes, etc.

2.

3.

The OECD first published the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income
and on Capital (30 July 1963), Models IBFD and then the OECD
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Apr. 1977), Models
IBFD, which was soon adopted by OECD Member countries and
non-OECD countries in bilateral treaty negotiations. The OECD Model
is accompanied by an article-by-article Commentary. From 1992, the
OECD Model and Commentary were published in a loose-leaf format.
The most recent condensed version is OECD Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital (22 July 2010), Models IBFD. For a “read only”
version, see http://fiscus.fgov.be/interfafznl/fr/downloads/ocde_en.pdf.
The most relevant versions for China ’s treaty negotiations is the OECD
Model (1977), although some Commentaries adopted in the 1990s, such
as the Commentary on Article 1 in respect of improper use of tax treaties,
appear to have had a significant effect on China ’s tax treaties and treaty
practice.
The UN first published the UN Model Tax Convention on Income and
on Capital (1 Jan. 1980), Models IBFD. The next updated version was
the UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2001),
Models IBFD, also available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/
public/documents/un/unpan002084.pdf ) and then the UN Model Tax
Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2011), Models IBFD, also
available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Model_2011_Update.
pdf.
© IBFD
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2. The Great Fiscal Wall: China’s Treaty Network
2.1. An extensive network
China’s first tax treaty was the China–Japan Income Tax
Treaty (1983),4 concluded three years after the promulgation of the first income tax laws.5 By the end of 2011,
China had developed one of the largest treaty networks in
the world, with close to 100 tax treaties, covering OECD
Member countries, transition countries and developing
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as
Hong Kong and Macau, which are Special Administrative Regions of China.6
Table 1 in the Appendix lists the countries that have concluded a tax treaty with China in the following six groups:
(1) OECD Member countries; (2) the other BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia and India); (3) transition countries;
(4) treaty haven countries, i.e. countries that are known as
friendly jurisdictions for tax planning purposes because of
their extensive treaty network and lower withholding tax
rates or narrower scope of source taxation; (5) developing
countries; and (6) Hong Kong and Macau.
Between 1983 and 2011, there appear to have been three
phases in the development of China’s treaty network.
Phase one was started with the China–Japan Income Tax
Treaty (1983). Over the next five years, China had concluded tax treaties with the United States (1984), France
(1984), the United Kingdom (1984, renegotiated in 2011),
Belgium (1985, renegotiated in 2009), Germany (1985),
Malaysia (1985), Norway (1986), Denmark (1986), Canada
(1986, renegotiated in 2012),7 Finland (1986, renegotiated in 2010), Sweden (1986), New Zealand (1986), Thailand (1986), Italy (1986), Singapore (1986, renegotiated
in 2007), the Netherlands (1987), the Czech Republic
(1987, renegotiated in 2009),8 Poland (1988) and Australia (1988). Tax treaties with the remaining OECD Member
countries were mostly concluded by 2000, with the exception of Greece (2002), Mexico (2005) and Israel (2010).
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the
People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (6 Sept. 1983),
Treaties IBFD.
CN: The Income Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China Concerning
Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment adopted by National
People ’s Congress and promulgated on 10 September 1980 (the “JVIT
Law”). CN: Individual Income Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China,
National Legislation IBFD was enacted by the 3rd Session of the 5th
National People ’s Congress and was also promulgated 10 September
1980.
For further discussion of the “one country, two tax systems” as a result of
the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region, see J. Li & D.
Elliot, One Country, Two Tax Systems: International Taxation in Mainland
China and Hong Kong, 57 Bull. Intl. Fiscal Docn. 4 (2003), Journals IBFD.
At the time of writing this article, the text of the renegotiated tax treaty
had not been officially published.
The Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s Republic of China
and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes
on Income (1 June 1987), Treaties IBFD continued to apply to Slovak
Republic after 1 January 1993 when the Czech Republic and Slovak
Republic became independent countries. A new tax treaty between China
and the Czech Republic was concluded on 28 August 2009 (Agreement
Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the
People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (28 Aug. 2009),
Treaties IBFD.

© IBFD

Chile seems to be the only OECD Member country that
does not have a treaty with China. In negotiating tax treaties with many OECD Member countries, China took the
position of a net capital-importing country and generally
insisted on more source-based taxation and tax sparing
in favour of China.
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, China negotiated
tax treaties with the other BRICs, transition countries
and many developing countries. In contrast to the OECD
Member countries, these countries receive investment
from China and would be expected to bargain for more
source-based taxation and tax sparing credit from China.
From the mid 2000s to 2011, while new tax treaties were
concluded, some earlier tax treaties were amended by way
of protocols, for example, the tax treaties with Barbados,
Korea (Rep.) and Mauritius, or completely renegotiated,
for example, the tax treaties with Belgium, Finland, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Anti-abuse became a
prominent theme in these tax treaties. The conclusion of
tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) was consistent with this theme. China entered into TIEAs with
some of the well-known tax havens, such as the Bahamas,
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands,
Guernsey, the Isle of Man and Jersey.9 It is beyond the
scope of this article to analyse TIEAs.
2.2. Motivation
The short time period between the promulgation of the
first income tax laws and the conclusion of the China–
Japan Income Tax Treaty (1983) and the rapid speed in
expanding the treaty network indicate the importance
placed by China on tax treaties. China is presumably
motivated to benefit from tax treaties. The most obvious
benefits are the prevention of double taxation and fiscal
evasion. Double taxation impedes cross-border investment, an evil that can be most effectively removed through
tax treaties. The prevention of international fiscal evasion
might not be a major concern in the earlier years, but arguably became so when outbound investment and capital
flight became more significant.10
During the 1980s, in addition to these tangible benefits, China may have been more motivated by the potential intangible benefits that tax treaties can generate, i.e.
the “signalling effect”. Foreign investment in China was
inevitably accompanied by interest in China’s tax system.
Foreign investors were naturally concerned as to how
much Chinese tax would be imposed on the income from
their Chinese investments, the stability of the Chinese tax
system and the resolution of disputes with Chinese tax
9.
10.

For more information, see the SAT website, www.chinatax.gov.cn.
For further discussion about why China was interested in entering tax
treaties, see X. Jin, Perfecting Foreign Taxation and Promoting Economic
Cooperation (1986), in Selected Works on Taxation by Jin Xin, vol.1, pp.
140-141 (China Taxn. Press 2008) (in Chinese) and Guiding Principles
and Policies for Our Country ’s Foreign Tax System in Selected Works on
Taxation by Jin Xin, vol. 2, pp. 640-650 (China Taxn. Press 2008) (in
Chinese); X. Wang, Discussion of Double Taxation Prevention Treaties
pp. 8-13 (China Fin. & Econ. Press 1887) (in Chinese); and X. Yang,
International Coordination on Income Taxation, in International Tax Law
2nd ed., pp. 334-336 (Beijing U. Press 2004) (in Chinese).
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authorities. After all, China was just beginning to learn
how to operate a modern income tax system and how to
interact with foreign investors after decades of isolation
and central planning. By entering into tax treaties on the
basis of the widely adopted models, China signalled to the
world community that it was prepared to follow the international tax norm. China also developed its domestic
tax system by transplanting concepts, principles and rules,
and by ensuring that the domestic rules are consistent with
the treaty rules. One example is the arm’s length principle
based on article 9 of the OECD Model.
Tax treaties were, of course, more than just signalling
devices. They delivered substantive tax benefits to foreign
investors. For instance, tax treaties reduced withholding
tax rates from the domestic 20% to 15% or lower. The tax
sparing clause in most tax treaties with OECD Member
countries ensure the Chinese tax incentives benefit the
investors as opposed to the treasury of the residence
country.
From the perspective of encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI), there appears to be no disadvantage in having
a tax treaty. While attracting FDI is important, using
the network as a Great Fiscal Wall to define and defend
China’s tax base might also be motivating factors. As a
large capital importing country, China can use tax treaties to clearly establish the boundaries of its tax base. This
is particularly true in the case of tax treaties with OECD
Member countries.
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of tax treaties were concluded with developing and transition countries. Arguably, treaty negotiations were motivated by
China’s interest in promoting Chinese outbound investment.11 Tax treaties are expected to protect China’s tax
base as a residence country and to prevent double taxation. These tax treaties serve slightly different functions
than those with OECD Member countries, as China is
more likely to be an exporter of FDI to the treaty partner
countries. As such, China might take the stance that is normally taken by OECD Member countries. On the other
hand, being a developing country, China might be more
sympathetic to the concerns of capital importing countries and be willing to concede to more source-based taxation than a typical OECD Member country.
Recently, China has started renegotiating some of the tax
treaties with capital exporting countries, while continuing expanding its treaty network to countries in Africa,
Asia and Latin America. The renegotiated tax treaties with
Belgium, Finland, Singapore and the United Kingdom
have a strong emphasis on anti-avoidance provisions,
less emphasis on source-based taxation, and the elimination of tax sparing. These features reflect the stance of a
more “mature” tax system. The signalling effect, therefore,
appears to be less important.

11.
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China ’s outbound investment was located in 132 countries in 2011.
See Invest in China, Summary of China ’s Outbound Non-financial
Investment in 2011, available at www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/
t20120119_140581.htm.
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2.3. Technical design - the OECD and UN Models
When China decided to introduce an income tax system
in the early 1980s as part of the economic reform programme, it had to look to the West and to other developing countries for precedents, especially in the area of
international taxation. When it came to tax treaties, the
dominance of the OECD Model and UN Model was too
obvious. China was eager to be seen as embracing the international tax regime. Therefore, adopting the Models
appears to be the only viable option. The only room for
debate was the extent of using the UN Model. It took China
about two years to negotiate the first tax treaty. Once the
China–Japan Income Tax Treaty (1983) had been finalized, it became the model for tax treaties with other OECD
Member countries and country-specific variations were
kept at a minimum.
Therefore, when it comes to building China’s Great Fiscal
Wall, China used the design and technology developed by
other countries. The OECD Model provides the structure
and the text of a tax treaty as a starting point in negotiations. The detailed OECD Commentaries worked like
a guidebook. To the Chinese tax administration, this
guidebook is invaluable as a learning tool and an operation manual. Recognizing the facts that the OECD Model
works better when the two treaty countries have more or
less equal flows of income and that China has an imbalanced flow with respect to OECD Member countries,
China turned to the UN Model to deal with the imbalance. The extent of reliance on the UN Model was presumably influenced by China’s interest in attracting investment from the other country and in securing source-based
taxation.
China has been recently involved in developing the OECD
Model and the UN Model. As an OECD non-member
country, China started participating in discussions on
revising the OECD Model or the Commentaries on the
OECD Model in the mid 1990s.12 Delegates from China
served as a member of the UN Ad Hoc Group of Experts
in the 1990s and the vice chairperson of the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax
Matters after 2005. As mentioned in section 6.5., China’s
participation in these discussions appears to have served
China well in becoming an early adopter of some innovative treaty rules (mostly related to anti-abuse).
2.4. Treaty interpretation and practice
The effect of tax treaties depends on how treaty provisions
are interpreted and implemented in practice. In China, the
State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is the competent
authority and responsible for implementing tax treaties.
There is no specific law on the interpretation of tax treaties. China ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (the Vienna Convention) (1969)13 in 1997. The
12.
13.

P. 427 OECD Model (2010).
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), Treaties
IBFD, also available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.
aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg
3&lang=en.
© IBFD
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interpretation principles provided in articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention apply in China. The most influential circular on treaty interpretation, Guoshuifa [2010]
No. 75 or the Treaty Interpretation Circular,14 cited the
Vienna Convention (1969) in the preamble. Article 3(2)
of the OECD Model, which governs the interpretation of
undefined terms in a tax treaty, has been incorporated into
China’s tax treaties so that the domestic law meaning of an
undefined term applies for treaty interpretation purposes
as long as it is consistent with the context of the tax treaty.
Chinese tax law clearly provides that in the case of any
inconsistency between domestic law and the provisions of
a treaty, the treaty prevails.15 The official texts of China’s
tax treaties are generally in Chinese, the language of the
treaty partner and English. In the event of interpretative
disputes, the English text generally prevails.

personal opinions in the interpretation of treaty provisions.25 The level of expertise at local levels varies greatly,
which may result in inconsistent interpretations across
the country.26
On the basis of the SAT interpretation circulars, it appears
that the SAT’s approach is consistent with article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, i.e. “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light
of its object and purpose”. The SAT has rejected the highly
textual and/or literal approach in favour of the substanceover-form doctrine.
2.5. Assessing the trends and policy framework

The SAT has the general power to interpret tax legislation
and tax treaties. The positions stated in the SAT circulars
are rarely contradicted by court decisions. There appears
to have been only one court decision on treaty interpretation, which contains minimal reasoning and analysis.16

Now that China’s treaty network appears to be well
established, it is a good time to assess the major trends in
China’s treaty policy. As all of the tax treaties are based
on the OECD Model and incorporate some provisions of
the UN Model, the trends are assessed by identifying the
differences between tax treaties and trying to make some
sense of the differences.27

The SAT has published a number of circulars on the
meaning of certain treaty provisions, such as residence,17
permanent establishment (PE),18 beneficial ownership,19
arm’s length principle20 and procedures for claiming treaty
benefits.21 In most cases, these administrative pronouncements are not treaty-specific. In cases where a circular22
interprets a specific tax treaty, for example, the China–
Singapore Income Tax Treaty (2007),23 the interpretative
guidelines are taken to have a more generic application.
OECD Commentaries, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines24 and other reports, and foreign practices and case
law, although not explicitly cited as authorities, appear
to have influenced the SAT’s interpretation of China’s
tax treaties. In practice, some SAT officials often use the
OECD Commentaries as a reference when giving their

For this purpose, countries are considered in the following five groups: (1) OECD Member countries; (2) transition countries; (3) treaty heaven countries; (4) developing
countries; and (5) countries with a renegotiated tax treaty
with China (see Table 2 in the Appendix). The research
does not cover each and every tax treaty due to time constraints. The selected tax treaties are representative of the
types of countries and the time of conclusion of the tax
treaty. Renegotiated tax treaties are analysed as a separate
group in order to capture the changes in China’s treaty
policy from the first decade to the third decade. In addition, in order to assess the role of Hong Kong as a gateway
for investment (inbound and outbound), Hong Kong’s
tax treaties are also examined at the end of this article (see
section 5.8.).

14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

SAT, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, The Interpretation of Provisions of
Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s Republic of China and
the Government of the Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Its Protocols.
See CN: Enterprise Income Tax of the People ’s Republic of China art. 58
(promulgated at the 5th session of the 10th National People ’s Congress of
China on 16 March 2007 and issued by Order of President No. 63 on 16
March 2007) (the “EIT Law”). CN: Implementation Regulations for the
Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China, National
Legislation IBFD was promulgated by State Council on 28 November
2007 and issued by the Order of the State Council No. 512 on 6 December
2007 (the “EIT Regulations”).
CN: BFIPC, 2001, PanAm SAT International Systems, Inc. v. Beijing State
Tax Bureau. For a brief discussion of this case, see sec. 4.4.4.
See sec. 3.3. and 3.4.
See sec. 4.3.2.
See sec. 5.5.
See sec. 5.4.
See sec. 3.4.
SAT, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the
Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income (11 July 2007), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.–Sing. Income
and Capital Tax Treaty].
OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and
Tax Administrations (OECD 2010), International Organizations’
Documentation IBFD.

© IBFD

This study is also limited to selected provisions that are
more telling of China’s major policy concerns about
the taxation of business profits, investment income and
capital gains, double taxation relief, and miscellaneous
provisions. Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes these
provisions in the UN Model. With regard to business
profits, the study focuses on the incorporation of articles
5 and 7 of the UN Model in respect of the meaning of the
term “permanent establishment” relating to construction
sites, the provision of services, the activities of agents and
limitations on the deduction of expenses in determining
the amount of profits attributable to the PE. With regard
to investment income, capital gains and other income, the
study focuses on provisions in the UN Model that deviate
from the OECD Model, such as the rate of withholding
taxes, the source-country taxation of gains derived from
25.
26.
27.

F. Cao, Corporate Income Tax Law and Practice in the People ’s Republic of
China, p. 268 (Oxford U. Press 2011).
Id.
For further discussion of China ’s tax treaties, see B. Arnold & J. Li, China ’s
Tax Treaty Policy, in China Tax Reform Options p. 78 (T. Fulton, J. Li & D.
Xu eds., World Scientific 1998) and M. Lang, J. Liu & G. Tang, Europe–
China Tax Treaties (Kluwer L. Intl. 2010).
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the alienation of shares and other income. Anti-abuse
rules covered by this study include the beneficial ownership rule, the arm’s length principle, the limitation on benefits (LOB) provision, the general anti-treaty abuse rule
and the domestic general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR).
3. Claimants of Treaty Benefits: The Meaning of
“Resident”
3.1. “Person”
China’s tax treaties typically cover persons who are residents of China and/or the other treaty country. A person
is defined to include “an individual, a company and any
other body of persons”. A “company” means “any body
corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate
for tax purposes”.
According to Chinese domestic law, “individuals” are tax
units under the Individual Income Tax Law and enterprises are tax units under the Enterprise Income Tax (EIT)
Law (2007). The meaning of “enterprise” is much broader
than that of a “company” to include for-profit and nonprofit entities, but not partnerships and sole proprietorships.28 Other entities include social organizations, associations, foundations, etc.29
For treaty purposes, the SAT interprets the term “person”
to have the meaning of “enterprise” under domestic law.
Partnerships are not “persons”, but associations and foundations, such as charitable organizations and pension
funds, are. A trust is not taxed as a separate entity under
Chinese law, but it can qualify as a “person” if the law of the
treaty partner country taxes the trust as a separate entity.30
3.2. Liable to tax
The meaning of the term “resident of a Contracting State”
in China’s tax treaties is generally based on article 4(1)
of the OECD Model, i.e. any person who, under the laws
of that sate, is liable to tax therein on the basis of criteria
such as domicile, residence, place of head office, place of
incorporation or any other criterion of a similar nature.
The meaning of “residence” is, therefore, derived from
domestic law. The phrase “liable to tax” is interpreted by
the SAT to mean “having the legal obligation to pay tax on
a comprehensive basis,” but “not actual payment of tax”.31
Charitable organizations, foundations and pension funds
that are exempt from tax under domestic law are regarded
as entities that are liable to tax and, therefore, qualify as
“residents” for treaty purposes. Similarly, a company that
pays no income tax because of tax incentives or loss carryovers is undeniably “resident” for treaty purposes.

than one year.32 For this purpose, an individual is considered to have a domicile in China if he or she habitually resides in China due to registered permanent residence, family or economic ties.33 The tax law concept of
“domicile” is tied to citizenship or immigration status.
Chinese citizens are subject to a household registration
system, which records the “official” address of each citizen.
Chinese citizens who are absent from China for a significant period of time for various reasons are often regarded
as domiciled in China for tax purposes, even though no
serious attempts have been made by the Chinese tax
authorities to actually tax their foreign income.34 NonChinese citizens living in China are domiciled in China
if they receive a permanent residence status, a privilege
infrequently bestowed. The full-year physical presence
test means that a person stays in China for more than a
year, ignoring temporary absences from China (no more
than 30 days per absence or no more than 90 days of total
absences during the year).
Corporations are liable to comprehensive tax liability in
China if they are incorporated in China or have a place of
effective management in China.35 Chinese-incorporated
companies typically include domestic enterprises, such as
state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises,
privately owned enterprises, and foreign-investment enterprises, such as joint venture companies and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Irrespective of the location of the
place of management, these domestic-incorporated companies are residents in China and taxable on their worldwide income.
The place-of-effective-management test becomes relevant when a company is incorporated outside China
(offshore company). Under Chinese domestic law, the
term “place of effective management” refers to “the place
that executes substantial and overall management and
control over the production and business operations,
personnel, finance, properties and other matters”.36 This
test has become increasingly important in determining
the Chinese residence of offshore companies that are controlled by Chinese investors. These offshore entities are
often used as vehicles to raise capital, directly or indirectly,
by holding shares of a public company whose shares are
traded at a stock exchange (typically in Hong Kong or the
United States).
Some offshore companies opt for the Chinese residence
status to minimize their tax liability. For instance, dividends paid to Chinese investors would be tax exempt in
China if the payer and the recipient of the dividends are
both residents of China. A company can also rely on the
Chinese tax treaties to reduce withholding taxes on invest-

3.3. Resident of China
Under Chinese domestic law, the basis for determining
an individual’s comprehensive, worldwide, tax liability is
either domicile or physical presence in China for more
28.
29.
30.
31.
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Art. 2 EIT Law.
Arts. 2 and 3 EIT Regulations.
Art. 3 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
Id., art. 4.
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32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

Art. 1 EIT Law.
Art. 2 EIT Regulations.
W. Cui, The Impact of the OECD and UN Model Conventions on China ’s
Tax Treaties, p. 2 (2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/wei_cui/8.
Art. 2 EIT Law. See J. Li, Fundamental Enterprise Income Tax Reform in
China: Motivations and Major Changes, 61 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2007),
Journals IBFD and J. Li & H. Huang, Transformation of the Enterprise
Income Tax: Internationalization and Chinese Innovations, 62 Bull. Intl.
Taxn. (2008), Journals IBFD.
Art. 4 EIT Regulations.
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ment received from third countries. This has reportedly
occurred in the case of China Unicom (HK) Ltd., which
received a tax refund from Spain under the China–Spain
Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1990).37 China Unicom
(HK) Ltd. was a listed company in Hong Kong, but had
its management and control in China. It held shares in a
Spanish company and received dividends. On the basis of
the tax treaty, China Unicom (HK) Ltd. claimed a refund
of the withholding tax that was withheld at the domestic rate (there was no tax treaty between Hong Kong and
Spain).38
Some other offshore companies prefer to avoid Chinese
residence to minimize Chinese tax. This is presumably
the case where the offshore company does not distribute
much of its profits to the shareholders and is not subject
to the Chinese controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules
which impute the profits to Chinese resident shareholders.39
The SAT provides the following four criteria for determining if the place of effective management is in China:40
(1) senior management and senior management departments that are responsible for daily production, operation and management of the corporation perform
their duties mainly within China;
(2) financial decisions (such as money borrowing,
lending, financing and financial risk management)
and personnel decisions (such as appointment, dismissal, salary and wages) are made or need to be
approved by organizations or persons located within
China;
(3) main property, accounting books, corporate seal
and records of meetings of the board of directors
and shareholders of the corporation are located in
China; and
(4) one half or more of the members of the board of
directors or the senior management staff of the corporation habitually reside in China.
These criteria are assessed in accordance with the substance-over-form principle.41 If all of the criteria are met,
the place of effective management is in China. An offshore
corporation can voluntarily report its Chinese residence
status. Otherwise, it may be assessed as such and required
to pay Chinese tax as a resident.42 The SAT approach to
determining corporate residence is presumably inspired

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Agreement Between the Government of Spain and the Government of the
People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
(22 Nov. 1990), Treaties IBFD.
See Hundreds of Millions of Tax Refund to China from Spain Because of the
Treaty Benefits, available at www.chinaacc.com/new/253_258_201109/0
5wa1069423316.shtml (in Chinese).
Art. 45 EIT Law.
SAT, Guoshuifa [2009] No. 82, art. 2.
Id., art. 3.
SAT Public Bulletin, 2001, No. 45, Measures on the Administration of
Tax Matters Regarding Offshore Companies Controlled by Chinese
Enterprises.
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by paragraph 24 of the OECD Commentary on Article 4
of the OECD Model (2010):43
The place of effective management is the place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance made. All
relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine
the place of effective management.

The issue of dual residence is resolved through tiebreakers
that are based on the OECD Model. In the case of individuals, these tests are permanent home, centre of vital interests, habitual abode, nationality and competent authorities. In the case of corporations, the tiebreaker is either
the place of effective management or the place of the head
office. The SAT interpretation of the tiebreakers is generally consistent with the OECD Commentary on Article 4.44
3.4. Resident of the other contracting state
In order to apply for treaty benefits, a non-resident taxpayer must provide the local tax authorities in China with
a residence certificate issued by the competent authority
of the other Contracting State.45 The SAT has a standard
format for proving Chinese residence.46
As discussed further in section 5.2., possessing a tax residence certificate in a treaty partner country is not a guarantee for enjoying the benefits of the tax treaty. Treaty
benefits may be denied in the case of treaty shopping or
other “abuse” situations.47
4. Defining China’s Tax Base
4.1. Introductory remarks
Tax treaties allocate the jurisdiction to tax business profits,
investment income and personal income between the two
countries. Treaty language is neutral and applies to both
countries without discrimination. Either country can be
the source country or the residence country in respect of
a specific item of income. In effect, however, because of
the imbalance in the flows of income between China and
its treaty partner, China is either a predominantly “source
country” or a “residence country”.
This section examines how tax treaties define and limit
the source country’s tax jurisdiction over business profits,
investment income, capital gains and personal services
income. The emphasis is on identifying and exploring
the extent to which the UN Model is incorporated into
these tax treaties. To that end, the discussion of each subsequent topic generally begins with a summary of the pertinent provision in the Models, the major differences, if
any, between the Models, the incorporation of the provision in Chinese tax treaties and concludes with an overview of the treaty practice in China.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on
Article 4 (22 July 2010), Models IBFD.
Art. 4 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
SAT, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 395, Notice on Printing the Samples of
Resident Certificates of Some Countries and Regions (24 July 2009).
SAT, Guoshuihan, [2008] No. 829, Notice on Carrying out the Work of
Issuing China Tax Residence Certificate.
See secs. 5.5. and 5.6.
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4.2. “China”
For the purposes of tax treaties, “China” is defined as the
territory in which Chinese laws are effectively in force.
This is a subtle way of indicating that, at present, China
refers to “Mainland China”. China’s existing tax treaties
do not apply to Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan.
Chinese domestic tax laws regard Hong Kong, Macau and
Taiwan as foreign jurisdictions and treat residents in these
three regions as “non-residents” of China. In fact, China
has entered into a “tax arrangement” with Macau and
Hong Kong48 that is similar to the standard tax treaties.49
4.3. Business profits
4.3.1. Overview
China’s tax treaties generally follow the principle codified
in article 7(1) of the OECD Model and UN Model, i.e. business profits of an enterprise resident in a treaty country
are taxed in the other country only where the enterprise
carries on business in that country through a PE and the
profits are attributable to the PE. This principle is subject
to two notable exceptions. First, business profits in the
form of income from immovable property are taxable in
the country in the source country, i.e. where the property
is located (article 6 of the OECD Model and UN Model).
Second, business profits of international shipping and air
transportation enterprises are taxable exclusively in the
residence country (article 8 of the OECD Model and UN
Model). The rationale underlying these two exceptions
applies to the gains realized from the disposal of shares
of companies whose value is derived principally from
immovable property and shares of international transportation companies (see section 4.4.5.).
The application of article 7 is supported by three other
provisions: (1) article 5 defines the scope of a PE; (2) article
9 provides for the arm’s length principle that governs the
attribution of profits to a PE; and (3) article 14 deals with a
specific type of business profits, i.e. income from independent services, which has been removed from the OECD
Model (2000),50 but remains in China’s tax treaties. Table
4 in the Appendix shows the incorporation of articles 5
and 7 of the UN Model in Chinese tax treaties.
4.3.2. PEs
4.3.2.1. General definition
Article 5(1) of the two Models is identical in defining the
term “permanent establishment” to mean “a fixed place
of business through which the business of an enterprise

48.

49.
50.
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The Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People ’s Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong, the “Hong Kong Agreement” signed
in September 1984, following extensive negotiations between the Chinese
and British governments. The Hong Kong Agreement sets out the basis
on which Hong Kong will be returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.
A similar arrangement has been negotiated with Taiwan, but, at the time
of the writing of this article, had not yet been published.
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (29 Apr. 2000),
Models IBFD.
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is wholly or partly carried on”. It is found in China’s tax
treaties.
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular provides the following guidance on the interpretation of this provision:
(1) the physical place of business can be owned or rented
by the enterprise; and (2) it can be an office, a branch, a
hotel room, or equipment, a warehouse, a site or a retail
stall in a shopping mall. The place of business must be
fixed and its existence has a sense of permanence. The
notion of “fixed” encompasses activities conducted at
several locations within a geographical proximity. For
instance, when an enterprise uses several rooms in the
same hotel, the hotel can be regarded as a fixed place or,
when an enterprise sets up several booths in the same
marketplace, the marketplace may be regarded as a fixed
place of business.51 The temporal permanence of a place
of business is not affected by temporary suspension of the
business. In other words, a place of business qualifies as
a PE when it is intended to be “permanent”, but was terminated due to failure in business after a short period of
time in operation. In addition, when a place of business
is created for a temporary purpose, but ends up having a
longer existence, it is regarded as a PE.
The SAT broadly interprets the phrase “the business of an
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on” through the fixed
place of business, i.e. “any circumstances where the enterprise carries on activities at any location at its disposal”.52
The SAT provides the following two examples: (1) if the
enterprise signs contracts with customers in China and
the contracts are performed at a place of business in China,
the enterprise is considered to be carrying on business
through the place; and (2) if the place makes substantial
contributions to the relationship between the enterprise
and its Chinese clients, even if the contract is concluded
directly by the enterprise and the client, the enterprise is
considered to be carrying on its business through the place
of business in China.
4.3.2.2. Fixed place of business
Article 5(2) of the OECD Model and UN Model provides the following non-exhaustive list of examples of
fixed places of business as PEs: a place of management;
a branch; an office; a factory; a workshop; and a mine, an
oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of
natural resources.
Article 5(2) is generally found in Chinese tax treaties. The
SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular clarifies that “a place
of management” within the meaning of article 5 is different from the “place of effective management” for the purposes of determining corporate residence. Specifically, it
refers to a representative office that represents the enterprise in taking some management functions and these
functions are not the same as those performed by the
head office. “A mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or other
place of extraction of natural resources” is limited to situations where the enterprise has made investment and has
51.
52.

Art. 5 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
Id.
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obtained the right to extract and operate the resources. It
does not include situations where an enterprise is engaged
to provide contractual engineering services to explore or
develop natural resources.53

Examples include separate contracts for different types of
projects on a construction site or the highway construction project that changes the site with the progression of
the work.

4.3.2.3. Contract engineering and services

For the purposes of article 5(3), the services of an enterprise may be provided by an employee or other personnel
engaged by the enterprise who perform services under the
control and direction of the enterprise.56 The SAT Treaty
Interpretation Circular interprets services to include engineering, technical, management, design, training and consulting. In measuring the time period, for example, six
months or 183 days, the clock starts on the date when the
employees first arrive in China and stops when the project
is completed and ready for use by the client, but include
only the days when the employees are actually in China.
When there are multiple employees working on the contract concurrently, the counting is based on the number
of days, irrespective of the number of employees working
in China. For instance, an enterprise may have 10 employees working in China for 20 days without giving rise
to a PE, but an enterprise having one employee working
in China for 200 days does. The period or periods for
the same project or a connected project are aggregated.
The SAT considers the following three factors relevant to
determine if projects are connected: (1) whether they are
included in a master contract; (2) if the projects are governed by different contracts, whether those contracts are
signed by the same or related enterprises and whether the
implementation of the first project is the prerequisite condition for the implementation of the second project; and
(3) whether the nature of those projects is the same and
whether those projects are performed by the same people.

Article 5(3) of the UN Model differs from the OECD
Model in two respects. The OECD Model contains one
paragraph, stating that a “building site or construction
or installation project constitutes a permanent establishment only if it lasts more than twelve months”. The UN
broadens the PE definition by providing that a PE also
encompasses:
(1) a building site, a construction, assembly or installation project if the activities last more than six months;
(2) the rule in (1) also applies to supervisory activities
in connection with a building site, a construction,
assembly or installation project; and
(3) the “furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through employees or other
personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose,
but only if activities of that nature continue (for the
same or a connected project) within a Contracting
State for a period or periods aggregating more than
183 days in any 12-month period commencing or
ending in the fiscal year concerned”.
China’s tax treaties generally follow the UN Model (see
Table 4 in the Appendix), although the time period may
vary from six months to nine months, three months or
even twelve months in some tax treaties.54 In terms of
measuring the time period for the activities in connection
with a building site, construction, assembly or installation
project (referred to as “contractual engineering activities”
in the Treaty Interpretation Circular) or related supervisory activities, the SAT takes the position that the period
begins on the firstdate of implemention of the contract
(including preparation work) and ends on the date when
the project is completed and ready for use (including
trial operation). Once the clock starts, it does not stop to
account for the pause of work due to the lack of equipment, materials or bad weather.
If a main contractor subcontracts part of its work to a subcontractor, the time of the subcontractor is treated as part
of the time for the main contractor. Supervisory activities
of a general contractor generally include the work performed by a subcontractor as well as by an independent
project supervision contractor.55 If an enterprise undertakes two or more contractual projects at one work site in
China and these projects are commercially and geographically connected to form a whole project, these contracts
should be aggregated and the time period for the whole
project should begin from the commencement of the first
contract and end on the completion of the last project.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
For an overview of China ’s tax treaties with European countries, see T.
Ecker & J. Tang, Business Profits (Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14 OECD Model),
in Lang, Liu & Tang, supra n. 27, at pp. 33-78.
Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14. A separate PE may exist for the
independent supervision contractor, depending on the period of time of
its activities in China.
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4.3.2.4. Preparatory and auxiliary activities
Preparatory and auxiliary activities carried out by an
enterprise through a fixed place of business or agents do
not give rise to a PE under either the OECD Model or the
UN Model. The two Models differ, however, in dealing
with the use of facilities or the maintenance of stock for
the purpose of delivery of goods or merchandise, i.e. such
activity constitutes a PE under the UN Model, but not
under the OECD Model.
China’s tax treaties generally follow the OECD Model.57
According to Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75,58 places used to
carry out preparatory and auxiliary activities generally
have the following characteristics:
–

There are no independent business activities performed in the place. The activities performed do not
constitute an essential or key part of the enterprise’s
business activities as a whole.

–

The activities are those listed in the tax treaty and
are performed only for the enterprise and not for any
other enterprises.

56.
57.
58.

Id., art. 5(3).
See Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at p. 62.
Art. 5(4) Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
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–

The responsibility is limited to the nature of routine
activities, not activities that directly generate business profits. The key is to determine if the activity is
auxiliary to the main business activity or is the business proper. For instance, purchasing activities may
be auxiliary if the purchasing is for the enterprise, but,
if the procurement is for the clients of the enterprise,
the activities in China are of the business proper, not
auxiliary within the meaning of article 5(4).

4.3.2.5. Agents and insurance premiums
In addition to a “fixed place of business”, both Models
deem an agent to constitute a PE under certain conditions.
In the case of a dependent agent, a key condition is that
the agent “has, and habitually exercises, in a Contracting
State an authority to conclude contracts in the name of
the enterprise”. Both Models provide that independent
agents are not deemed to be a PE. The UN Model deviates from the OECD Model in three respects and deems
an agent to be a PE where: (1) a person without the authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise
is nonetheless considered to be a dependent agent if that
person “habitually maintains a stock of goods or merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of the enterprise” (article 5(5)(b) of the UN
Model); (2) an independent agent is considered not to be
independent when his/her activities are devoted wholly or
almost wholly on behalf of one enterprise (article 5(7) of
the UN Model); and (3) an insurance company collecting
premiums in another state is deemed to have a PE in that
other state under article 5(6) of the UN Model.
China’s tax treaties do not universally follow the UN
Model. In fact, article 5(6) of the UN Model is rarely
adopted in tax treaties with OECD Member countries,
let alone those with transition and developing countries
(see Table 4 in the Appendix).
The SAT interpretation of agency PE is governed by the
substance-over-form principle. The “authority to conclude contracts” means not only “signing” contracts, but
also “participating in contractual negotiations and discussion of contractual terms”.59 For this purpose, “contracts”
refer to those relating to the business of the enterprise, and
not contracts dealing with internal affairs of the enterprise, such as employment contracts. The term “habitually
exercise” does not necessarily mean the frequency of participation in negotiations or the number of contracts concluded. Its meaning in a given situation depends on the
nature of the contract involved, the nature of the business
of the enterprise and the frequency of the agent’s activities. Some contracts require extensive, time-consuming
negotiations (such as the purchase of airplanes and shipping vessels) and the conclusion of a single contract may
give rise to a PE.
In determining whether or not an agent is an independent agent whose activities do not give rise to a PE for the
principal, the SAT requires the agent be legally and eco59.
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Id., art. 5(5).
BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SEPTEMBER 2012

nomically independent. The independence of an agent
is determined by considering three questions: (1) is the
agent independent in conducting business activities?, i.e.
if the principal provides specific instructions and exercises
overall control over the activities of the agent, the agent is
not independent; (2) who bears the commercial risk?, i.e. if
the risk is borne by the principal, the agent is not independent; and (3) how many principals does the agent have?,
i.e. if the agent represents only one enterprise during a significant period of time, then the agent is not independent.
4.3.2.6. Subsidiary as PE
A subsidiary of a company does not, on its own, constitute a PE for the parent under both Models (article 5(7)
of the OECD Model and article 5(8) of the UN Model).
China’s tax treaties contain this provision. In determining
whether the activities of a subsidiary constitute a PE for
its parent, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75 looks at whether the
personnel seconded to the subsidiary are under the direction and control of the subsidiary or whether the subsidiary acts as an agent for the parent. Seconded employees
from the parent may be considered to be working for the
parent, not the subsidiary, if one of the following conditions is met:60
– the parent has control over these employees and bears
the related risk and responsibilities;
– the parent decides the number and qualifications of
these employees;
– the parent bears the cost of compensation; or
– the parent earns profits by sending these people to
work at the subsidiary.
The Circular does not mention the period of time required
for the employees to work in China to satisfy the PE test.
4.3.3. Attribution of profits to a PE
4.3.3.1. Introductory remarks
Both Models contain a basic principle for attributing
business profits to a PE, i.e. business profits derived by
an enterprise resident in a contracting state through a PE
in another contracting state are taxable to the extent of
profits attributable to the PE. The UN Model deviates
from the OECD Model in several respects to broaden the
tax base of the source country.
4.3.3.2. Profits attributable to a PE
Under article 7(1) of the UN Model, the attributable
profits also include the profits that are attributable to the
“sales in that other State of goods or merchandise of the
same or similar kinds as those sold through the permanent establishment”, or “other business activities carried
on in that other State of the same or similar kind as those
effected through that permanent establishment”. In other
words, the UN Model contains a limited force of attraction.

60.

Id., art. 5(7). The services fees paid by the subsidiary to the parent must
be reasonable to be deductible to the subsidiary.
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China’s tax treaties do not contain such force of attraction principle.61 The SAT interprets “profits attributable
to a PE” to include not only the profits derived by the PE
from Chinese sources, but also income earned from both
inside or outside China that is effectively connected to the
PE, such as dividends, interest, rent and royalties.62 The
term “effectively connected” means that there is an ownership or effective management relationship in respect of the
underlying equity, debt, industrial property or equipment.

4.3.3.4. Limitations on deduction

Article 7(5) of the OECD Model further clarifies that no
profits are attributed to a PE by reason of the mere purchase by that PE of goods or merchandise for the enterprise. This provision is missing in the UN Model as the
UN Ad Hoc Expert Group saw no need in including such
provision:63

The UN Model continues with a prohibition of any deduction for expenses, other than reimbursement of actual expenses, paid by the PE to its head office by way of: (1) royalties, fees or other similar payments in return for the use
of patents or other intangibles; (2) management fees and
other fees for services; and (3) interest, except where the
enterprise is a bank.64 Intuitively, these prohibitions contradict the principle of treating each PE as an independent
enterprise dealing at arm’s length with its head office, but
do serve the purpose of attributing more profits to a PE,
thereby broadening the tax base of the source country that
would otherwise be the case under the OECD Model.

Since under Article 5 an office or facility maintained by an enterprise in a Contracting State in the other Contracting State for
mere purchase of goods or merchandise does not constitute a
permanent establishment, there would be very few cases where an
enterprise having a permanent establishment dealing with other
business would also have a purchasing facility for the enterprise.

China’s tax treaties generally contain article 7(5) of the
OECD Model. The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular
reiterates the point that this rule applies only to the purchase of goods or merchandise for the enterprise and any
expenses incurred by the PE in respect of such purchasing activities are not deductible in computing the profits
attributable to the PE. If the only activities of the place of
business of an enterprise are the purchasing of goods or
merchandise for the enterprise, there is no PE, therefore,
no need to apply article 7.
4.3.3.3. Distinct and separate entity
Article 7(2) of the two Models is identical, providing that
central principle in attributing profits to a PE, i.e. the
profits attributable to a PE are the profits which the PE
might be expected to make “if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities
under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly
independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment”. This provision extends the arm’s
length principle to the attribution of profits by deeming
a PE to be a distinct enterprise dealing at arm’s length with
the enterprise and other PEs of the enterprise.
China’s tax treaties contain article 7(2). The SAT Treaty
Interpretation Circular recognizes the importance of the
arm’s length principle in attributing profits to a PE and
expects fair market prices to be used in determining the
profits derived by a PE from transactions with the enterprise and other PEs of the enterprise.

Article 7(3) of the Models contains rules for allowable
deductions and the UN Model is more restrictive. The
pre-2010 OECD Model provides that:
there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred
for the purposes of the business of the permanent establishment
including executive and general administrative expenses so incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.

China’s tax treaties with OECD countries generally incorporate article 7(3) of the UN Model, but tax treaties with
transition countries or developing countries generally do
not.65 The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular reiterates
the principle that all expenses incurred for the purpose of
the PE, irrespective of where the expenses are incurred, are
deductible in computing the profits of a PE. The deductible expenses include those that are not directly related
to the PE, but are general and administrative expenses
allocated to the PE by the head office. However, the expenses that are allocated to the PE must be incurred for
the purpose of the PE and the amount must be reasonable.
The enterprise is required to prove the reasonableness of
the amounts by providing information on the scope and
amount of the total expenses and the basis and methodology for allocation.
4.3.3.5. Deemed profits or apportionment of profits
Article 7(4) and 7(5) of the two Models are identical.
Article 7(4) allows the determination of the profits attributable to a PE on the basis of an apportionment of the total
profits of the enterprise to its various parts insofar as it
has been customary to use the apportionment method in
the contracting state and the method is used in accordance with the principles contained in article 7. Article 7(5)
requires that the same method be used year by year, unless
there is a good and sufficient reason to the contrary.

64.
61.
62.
63.

Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at p. 35.
Art. 7(1) Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on
Article 7 (1 Jan. 1980), Models IBFD. The UN Model (2011) notes at the
end of art. 7 that “The question of whether profits should be attributed
to a permanent establishment by reason of the mere purchase by that
permanent establishment of goods and merchandise for the enterprise
was not resolved. It should therefore be settled in bilateral negotiations”.
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Art. 7(3) of the UN Model also states that “no account shall be taken, in the
determination of the profits of a permanent establishment, for amounts
charged (otherwise than towards reimbursement of actual expenses), by
the permanent establishment to the head office of the enterprise or any
of its other offices, by way of royalties, fees or other similar payments in
return for the use of patents or other rights, or by way of commission for
specific services performed or for management, or, except in the case of
a banking enterprise by way of interest on moneys lent to the head office
of the enterprise or any of its other offices”.
Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at pp. 40-43.
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China’s tax treaties generally include article 7(4) and (5).66
Under Chinese domestic law, it has been customary to
use the deemed profit methods in computing taxable
income of non-resident enterprises carrying on business
in China.67 The deemed profit methods are used when enterprises do not maintain accurate accounting books and
cannot declare and pay taxes on an actual basis.68 There
are three bases for determining the deemed profits: (1)
total revenue; (2) costs and expenses; and (3) operating
expenditures. The deemed profits rates are 15% to 30%
for engineering projects, design and consulting services;
30% to 50% for management services; and not less than
15% for other services or other businesses.69
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular recognizes the
possible differences in the outcome of using the apportionment method and actual profit method (based on
the accounting records of the taxpayer). The SAT also
acknowledges the difficulties in applying the apportionment method, as it is not easy to determine and verify the
total profit of the non-resident enterprise. It is difficult for
the tax authorities of the source country to determine the
profit of the head office or the taxable profit as assessed by
the tax authorities in the residence country.
4.4. Investment income, capital gains and other
income
4.4.1. Overview
Treaty provisions on dividends, interest, royalties, capital
gains and other income are good indicators of the scope
of source-country taxation. Because the residence country
always has the jurisdiction to tax such income and the
obligation to provide relief from double taxation, tax treaties differ in respect of the scope of source taxation. As in
the case of business profits, the extent of incorporation
of the UN Model in China’s tax treaties reveals China’s
treaty policies. An overview is presented in Table 5 in the
Appendix.
4.4.2. Dividends
Article 10 of the OECD Model and the UN Model are
largely identical.70 The source country is defined to be the
residence country of the company that pays the dividends
66.
67.

68.
69.
70.
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A small number of China ’s tax treaties do not contain these two
provisions. Examples are the original tax treaty with the United Kingdom
and the tax treaty with Turkey.
For further discussion, see Cao, supra n. 25, at pp. 33-43 and P. Tao &
S. Kim, A Brief Examination of Recent Chinese Tax Rules on Nonresident
Enterprises, The Tax Mag. p. 35 (Dec. 2009) and An Update on Recent
Chinese Tax Rules on Nonresident Enterprises, The Tax Mag. p. 33 (Nov.
2010).
SAT, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 19, Notice on the Administrative Measures
Concerning Income Tax Collection on Non-resident Enterprises on
Deemed Basis (20 Feb. 2010).
It is questionable as to whether or not the deemed 15% profit rate
(previously, 10%) is consistent with article 7 of tax treaties. Ecker & Tang,
supra n. 54, at pp. 40-41.
As the UN Model has art. 14 (independent personal services), when a PE
is referred to in the OECD Model, the “fixed base” concept is included in
the UN Model in respect of determining if the dividends are connected
to a PE or fixed base to be taxed under art. 7, as opposed to art. 10. The
UN Model also leaves the withholding tax rate blank to allow the two
countries greater flexibility.
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(article 10(1)). As long as the beneficial owner of dividends is a resident of the other contracting state, the treaty
rates of withholding tax apply. Both Models permit split
rates for direct dividends and portfolio dividends. The
UN Model leaves the specific rates blank, but the OECD
Model sets a 5% rate for direct dividends and 15% rate for
portfolio dividends. In order to qualify for the lower rate,
the OECD Model requires the shareholder to hold directly
at least 25% of the capital of the company paying the dividends (article 10(2)), whereas the UN Model requires
the shareholder to hold directly at least 10% of the capital
of the company paying the dividends. Dividends that are
effectively connected with a PE of the shareholder in the
source country are taxable under article 7 (article 10(4)).
China’s tax treaties closely follow the OECD Model with
the exception of the split rates. The majority of these tax
treaties provide for a single withholding tax rate, although
more recent tax treaties use split rates (see Table 5 in the
Appendix). The standard rate of withholding is 10%.71 In
the case of split rates, 5% is generally used for direct dividends. In addition, some of the recent Chinese tax treaties
contain a specific anti-abuse provision, which is discussed
in more detail in section 5.6.
Chinese domestic law imposes a 10% withholding tax
on dividends received by a non-resident, irrespective
of the percentage of equity ownership.72 For treaty purposes, the term “dividends” is interpreted to include
the amount of interest that exceeds the limits under the
thin capitalization rules and is taxed as dividends under
domestic law.73 The distinction between debt and equity
(interest and dividends) is based on the substance-overform principle. If the form of investment is debt but the
lender actually bears the risks of the borrowing company,
the interest can be regarded as a dividend. The SAT Treaty
Interpretation Circular sets forth the following factors in
determining whether or not a lender shares the risks of
the company:
– the amount of the loan significantly exceeds other
forms of investment in the company and is substantially unmatched by assets with liquidity;
– the lender shares in any profits of the company;
– the repayment of the loan is subordinated to claims of
other creditors or to the payment of dividends;
– the level of payment of interest depends on the profits
of the company; and
– the lending contract does not specify the exact date
of repayment.
The equity ownership percentage required to qualify for
the lower rate for direct dividends includes both direct
ownership and indirect ownership. The SAT’s policy is
71.

72.

73.

The 15% rate is used in very few tax treaties, such as those with Australia,
Canada and the Philippines; and a 10% rate is used for portfolio dividends
in the tax treaty with the Philippines and a 7% rate in the tax treaty with
Austria.
Art. 91 EIT Regulations. Until 2008, the rate was zero. See CN: Income
Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises art. 19, National Legislation IBFD
promulgated by the National People ’s Congress on 9 April 1991 (the
“FIET Law”).
Art. 10 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
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to look at the equity ownership of a non-resident investor during a 12-month period prior to the receipt of dividends. If the required equity ownership ratio (typically
25%) is exceeded at any time during this period, the lower
treaty rate applies.74
4.4.3. Interest
Article 11 of the OECD Model is largely reproduced in
the UN Model, except that the UN Model leaves the rate
of withholding tax blank (as in the case of article 10(2)).75
The source country is determined by the payer’s residence
or under the base-erosion rule. Under the base-erosion
rule, where a Chinese non-resident has a PE in China and
pays interest to a beneficial owner resident in the other
contracting state, if the interest is borne by the company’s PE in China, the interest is deemed to arise in China.
Interest may be taxed as business profits under article 7
if it is effectively connected with a PE of the beneficial
owner in the source country. Article 11(6) clarifies that the
treaty reduced rate is not available to the amount of interest that exceeds the arm’s length amount due to a special
relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner
or between both of them and some other person.
China’s tax treaties follow the OECD Model. Chinese
domestic law imposes a 20% withholding tax on interest
received by a non-resident.76 This rate is reduced to 10% by
Chinese tax treaties.77 A zero rate is generally provided for
interest on loans received by the “government” or “policy
banks” (such as the China Development Bank, the ExportImport Bank and their equivalent in the other contracting
state).78 Interest that is effectively connected with a PE in
China is taxable at the standard corporate tax rate of 25%
on a net basis.79
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular clarifies that
guarantee fees are treated as interest for the purposes of
article 11, but only if the guarantee is attached to the debt
that generates the interest, not provided as an independent transaction.80 In the case of interest received by a beneficial owner who is a resident of a treaty country from an
enterprise that is a resident of a third country but maintains a PE in China and the interest expense is borne by
the PE, the interest is deemed to arise in China and eligible for the treaty reduced rate. However, if the debt is
shifted by the third-country resident to the Chinese PE
to take advantage of the tax incentives available to the PE,
the reduced treaty rate does not apply.81 Some renegotiated tax treaties also contain a general anti-abuse rule in
article 11 and/or article 12 (see section 5.6.).
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.

SAT, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 81, Notice on the Implementation of Tax
Treaty Provision on Dividends, Circular No. 75, Article 10.
Art. 11(4) and (5) of the UN Model also refers to “fixed base” to reflect the
fact that art. 14 is a separate provision in the UN Model, but not in the
OECD Model.
Art. 3 EIT Law.
Some tax treaties provide for a lower rate. For instance, a 7% rate is used
in the tax treaties with Algeria and Hong Kong, a 7.5% rate in the tax
treaties with Cuba, Jamaica and Nigeria; and a 5% rate in the tax treaties
with Kuwait and Laos.
For instance, art. 11 of the P.R.C.–Sing. Income and Capital Tax Treaty.
Id., art. 3.
Art. 11 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
Id.
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4.4.4. Royalties
The scope of source taxation is much broader under the
UN Model than under the OECD Model, which provides
for exclusive jurisdiction to the residence country. The UN
Model allows the source country to tax royalties at a limited
rate (left blank) and expands the definition of “royalties”.
The definition of “royalties” under the UN Model is the
same as under earlier OECD Model (1992),82 including
equipment rental as royalties. Both Models include in the
definition of royalties payments for the use of or the right
to use industrial property (copyright, patent, trademark,
design or model, plan, secret formula or process and payments for information concerning industrial, commercial
or scientific experience).
Article 12(4) of the UN Model provides that royalties
that are effectively connected with a PE are covered by
article 7. Article 12(5) defines the source of royalties to
be the payer’s residence country. However, if the payer
has a PE in one of the treaty countries and the royalties
are incurred in connection with the PE and are borne by
such PE, whether or not the payer is a resident of that
country, the royalties are deemed to arise in that country.
In other words, the “base-erosion” test trumps the payer’s
residence test. Under article 12(5) of the UN Model, if
by reason of a special relationship between the payer and
the beneficial owner or between both of them and some
other person, the amount of royalties, in excess of the
arm’s length amount, is not eligible for the reduced rate.
China’s tax treaties follow the UN Model. Many treaties
allow a lower rate (6% or 7%) of withholding tax on equipment rental (which is the lower rate shown in Table 5 in
the Appendix).83
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular offers some guidance on the meaning of “royalties”.84 Royalties in respect of
industrial or intellectual property rights include payments
for such rights whether such rights are registered under
Chinese law or whether the payments are made under a
licence or for damages for infringement. The term “information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific
experience” should be understood as “proprietary technology”. Proprietary technologies generally refer to the
information that is not disclosed to the public and is necessary for the duplication of a product or a production
process. Royalties on licensing proprietary technologies
usually involve the permission to use such information
by a licensee where the licensor does not normally participate in the implementation of the technology and does not
guarantee the result of such implementation. The licensed
technology normally already exists, but may include technologies to be developed subsequently pursuant to the
needs of the licensee and the use of which is subject to
the confidentiality provision of the contract.
82.
83.

84.

OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Sept. 1992),
Models IBFD was amended in to eliminate equipment rental from art. 12.
Very few tax treaties deviate from the 10% rate. For instance, the rates are
25% and 10% in the tax treaty with Brazil, 15% and 10% in the tax treaties
with Malaysia and the Philippines, and 12.5% in the tax treaty with
Pakistan. Presumably, these rates were insisted on by the other country.
Art. 12 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
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In respect of the distinction between service fees that are
subject to article 7 (and/or article 14 under the UN Model)
and royalties covered by article 12, the SAT provides the
following guidance:
–

With regard to services furnished under a general
contract, if proprietary knowledge and technologies
are used in the process of providing services, in the
absence of a licence for the use of such knowledge or
technologies, the fees paid for services are not royalties. However, if certain proprietary property is developed during the process of providing services and the
service provider owns the property and the client only
has a right to use, the fees paid for such services fall
within the scope of royalties.85

–

With regard to technical support and instructions
provided by the licensor in connection with the
transfer or licensing of technology, the fees paid for
such technical services are in the nature of royalties,
whether the fees are charged separately or as part of
the licence fees. However, if the services give rise to a
PE, the service fees attributable to the PE are taxable
under article 7.86

–

Fees paid in respect of after-sales services, warranties,
professional services of engineering, management
and consultancy are not in the nature of royalties.87

In addition, payments to a non-resident company for
transmitting Chinese TV programmes by satellite to different parts of the world are characterized as equipment
rentals sourced in China for the purposes of the China–
United States Income Tax Treaty (1986).88,89 The SAT
interpretation was upheld by the Beijing Intermediate
Court and Beijing High Court in PanAmSat International
Systems, Inc. (2001).90
PanAmSat is arguably the only reported court decision on
a substantive tax matter. In this case, the taxpayer was a
resident of the United States. It argued that the payments
at issue were for services provided and not for the right to
use any equipment on the following grounds:
(1) The equipment was at all times under its control and
operation and the Chinese client, CCTV, had no right
to operate such equipment, and the equipment itself
could not automatically execute the contract with
CCTV. In other words, CCTV had no right to use
any equipment and the only person who could and
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.
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Id.
Id. The Circular continues to state that the individuals who provide the
services are subject to art. 15 of the tax treaty.
Id. and SAT, Guiguihan [2009] No. 507, Notice on the Relevant Issues of
the Application of Royalty Article of Double Taxation Agreements (14
Sept. 2009).
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with respect to Taxes
on Income (30 Apr. 1984), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.–U.S. Income
Tax Treaty].
SAT, Guoshuihan [1999] No. 566, Reply on Issues Concerning the
Imposition of Tax on Rental Income Derived by PanAmSat from Leasing
Satellite Communication Lines to CCTV (19 Aug. 1999).
CN: BFIPC, 2001, PanAmSat International Systems, Inc. v. Beijing State Tax
Bureau, yizhonghang chuzi No. 168 Administrative Judgement.
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did use the equipment was PanAmSat. CCTV only
had the right to use a specified bandwidth.
(2) The characterization of income should be based on
the contract between PanAmSat and CCTV. The
contract clearly stated that PanAmSat was to provide
transmission services and that no right to use any
property was transferred to CCTV.
(3) The payments for the services provided under the
contract gave rise to business profits for the purpose
of the China–United States Income Tax Treaty
(1986). As PanAmSat did not carry on business in
China through a PE, such income was not taxable in
China.
These arguments were rejected by the First Intermediate
People’s Court of Beijing. The Court held that CCTV had
the right to use a specified bandwidth and such bandwidth
was part of the satellite system, and the payments for such
fell within the scope of “royalties” for the purposes of the
tax treaty. The services provided by PanAmSat were subordinate to the use of the satellite system. Article 11 of
the China–United States Income Tax Treaty (1986) also
does not explicitly state that the “right to use” any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment is limited to the
“actual possession and operation” of such equipment.
Accordingly, the fact that CCTV did not actually possess
and operate the satellite system could not support the conclusion that the payments gave rise to services fees taxable
as business profits. The Intermediate Court’s decision was
upheld by the Higher People’s Court of Beijing.91 This case
has been controversial among Chinese commentators.92
4.4.5. Capital gains
Both Models allow the source country to tax gains from
the disposal of immovable property, movable property
forming part of the business property of a PE (article 13(1)
(2)) and allow gains from the disposal of ships and aircraft
operated in international traffic and for boats engaged in
inland waterways transport and movable property pertaining to the operation of such ships, aircraft and boats
to be taxed in the country in which the place of effective
management of the enterprise operating such ships, aircraft and boats is situated.
Under articles 13(1) and 13(2), the source of gains is determined by the location of immovable property and the PE.
With regard to gains from the alienation of shares deriving more than 50% of their value directly or indirectly
from immovable property, article 13(4) of the UN Model
(1980)93 allows the state where the immovable property is
situated to tax the gains so that gains from the alienation of
91.
92.

93.

The Chinese text of this decision is available at http://shlx.chinalawinfo.
com/NewLaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=117487335.
See Cui, supra n. 34; G. Tan, Tax Treaties’ Interpretation and Application
under the Challenges of the Digital Economy – Issues Raised by PANAMSAT
v. Beijing State Tax Bureau, 16, Revenue L. J. 1, p. 99 (2006); and S. Hao,
The PanAmSat Case and Distinction between Business Profits and Royalties,
in Wuda Guojie (reproduced by the China Academic J. Elec. Publg. H. at
www.cnki.net) (in Chinese).
The UN Model (2001) extends this rule to interests in a partnership, trust
or estate.
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such shares and gains from the alienation of the underlying immovable property are equally taxable in the source
country. A similar provision was added to the OECD
Model (2003).94 Article 13(5) of the UN Model, which has
no equivalent in the OECD Model, further allows a state
to tax gains from the alienation of shares (other than those
covered by article 13(4)) representing a specified percentage of shares in a company which is a resident of that state.
In other words, the source of such gains is determined by
the residence of the company whose shares are alienated.
The UN Model leaves the required equity ownership percentage to be determined through bilateral negotiations.
With regard to gains from the alienation of any property
other than that specifically covered by the rest of article 13,
neither Model allows the source country to tax such gains.
Article 13(4) of the UN Model is found in many of China’s
tax treaties (see Table 5 in the Appendix). Article 13(5) is
contained in all renegotiated tax treaties and 40% of the
tax treaties with European countries.95 The specified percentage of equity ownership under article 13(5) is generally 25%, which coincides with the percentage used for
distinguishing between direct dividends and portfolio dividends for the purposes of article 10. Some more recent
tax treaties include a clause that is now found in the UN
Model (2011), i.e. the equity ownership is determined
during the 12-month period preceding the alienation. In
addition, some recent tax treaties exclude shares of publicly traded companies from the scope of article 13(5).96
Some of China’s tax treaties reject the catch-call provision
of both Models by allowing the source country to tax gains
from the alienation of “other property”.97
Chinese domestic laws provide for extensive source-based
taxation of capital gains, including gains from the sale of
shares in the capital stock of Chinese resident companies.98 The taxation of gains from the alienation of shares
in Chinese resident companies has been subject to much
administrative interpretation. 99 The meaning of “shares of
the capital stock of a company the property of which consists directly or indirectly principally of immovable property situated in China” is interpreted as follows:
–

The term “immovable property” has the same
meaning as under Chinese domestic law, which
includes land use rights.

94.

OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (28 Jan. 2003),
Models IBFD.
B. Folhs & W. Guo, Capital Gains (Article 13 OECD Model), in Lang, Liu
& Tang, supra n. 27, at pp. 139-162.
This is similar to the suggested version in UN Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 13 para. 13 (1 Jan. 2011),
Models IBFD.
Folhs & Guo, supra n. 95 demonstrate such deviation in Chinas tax
treaties with Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway,
Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden.
Art. 3 EIT Law and Art. 7(3) EIT Regulations.
See, for example, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14 and SAT,
Guoshuihan [2007], No. 43, Notice on the Interpretation and
Implementation of Certain Articles of the Arrangement between the
Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Administration Region for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
respect to Taxes on Income (4 Apr. 2007).

95.
96.
97.

98.
99.
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–

The residence of the company whose shares are alienated may be in China or the other country.

–

The percentage of equity ownership by the alienator
is irrelevant to determining China’s tax jurisdiction
over the gains.

–

The term “principally” means 50% or more.

–

The determination of whether or not more than 50%
of the value of the shares alienated is derived from
immovable property situated in China can be based
on a three-year period (unless another period is stipulated in the tax treaty).

–

The value of property is based on the book value.

–

The use of the term “indirectly” requires looking
through the value of shares of lower-tier companies.
For instance, a non-resident company, NRC, owns
20% of a Chinese company, ChinaCo1, which in turn
owns 80% of another Chinese company, ChinaCo2.
ChinaCo1’s asset value is 100, including 40 in
immovable properties in China. ChinaCo2’s asset
value is 100, including 90 in immovable properties in
China. In determining whether more than 50% of the
value of shares in ChinaCo1 is derived from immovable property in China, the immovable property in
ChinaCo2 is taken into account. ChinaCo1’s total
value in immovable property is 40 (directly owned)
plus 80 (indirectly owned, 80% x 90 = 72) and the
total value in immovable property is 112, which is
62% of the total value of 180. In other words, 62%
of the value of ChinaCo1’s shares is derived, directly
and indirectly, from immovable property in China. 100

The SAT interprets provisions based on article 13(5) of
the UN Model very broadly, i.e.:
–

The 25% share ownership by a non-resident alienator
is determined “historically” in the sense that once the
25% threshold is met, the alienation of these shares
would give rise to Chinese taxation, whether or not
the shares are alienated in one transaction or several
transactions. For instance, if a company resident in a
treaty country acquired 40% of the shares of a Chinese
company in Year 1, sells 20% of the shares in Year 2
and the remainder in Year 3, even though the share
ownership is only 20% in Year 3, the transaction is still
within the scope of article 13(5). 101 If a tax treaty specifies a 12-month period for determining the ownership percentage, the “historical” approach is replaced
by the 12-month period.

–

“Indirect ownership” is determined by looking
through equity percentage of lower-tier companies.
For instance, if NR1 owns 5% of the shares of ChinaCo
and 50% shares of NR2, which owns 50% of ChinaCo,
NR1’s direct ownership is 5% and indirect ownership
is 25%, resulting in a total ownership of 30%. When

100. Art. 13 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
101. SAT Guoshuihan [2007] No. 403.
BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SEPTEMBER 2012

465

Jinyan Li

NR1 alienates its shares in ChinaCo, the gains are
taxable in China. 102
–

Share ownership of another person who is a member
of a related group and has a significant economic relationship with the alienator may be attributed to the
alienator. Such other person includes: (1) a person
who has identical interest, such as a direct family
member or an agent); (2) a person who directly owns
100% of the alienator; and (3) a company wholly
owned by a person in (1) or (2). For instance, Parent
owns 100% of each of Sub1 and Sub2, and Sub1 is a
resident of a treaty country. Each of Parent, Sub1 and
Sub2 owns directly 10% of ChinaCo. For the purposes
of applying article 13(5), Sub1 is deemed to own 30%
of shares of ChinaCo. This deeming rule applies when
there is no allegation of treaty abuse.

4.5. Income from personal services
4.5.1. Initial comments
China’s tax treaties have a mixture of provisions from the
two Models in respect of income from independent services, dependent personal services, directors’ fees, artistes
and athletes, and students.
4.5.2. Independent personal services
Article 14 was deleted in the OECD Model (2000) to
reflect the OECD’s position that income from independent personal services should be taxed in the source
country on the basis of the PE as there was no difference
intended between the concept of PE and “fixed base” as
used in article 14.
China’s tax treaties generally have a separate provision
on independent personal services, but follow the UN
Model. In addition to the “fixed base” test, China’s tax
treaties employ the 183-day presence test found in the UN
Model. China’s tax treaties with some developing countries contain a third condition for source taxation, i.e. the
fees are paid by a resident in that country103 or are borne
by a PE in that country.104
According to the SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular,105
the characterization of services as “independent services”
depends on whether there is any evidence of a profession
(including professional licence, registration certificate or
102. Art. 13 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
103. See, for example, Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s
Republic of China and the Government of Malta for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income (23 Oct. 2010), Treaties IBFD.
104. The Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia and the Government
of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income art. 14(1)
(23 Nov. 1985), Treaties IBFD provides that the source country may tax
professional income if the person stays in that country for more 183
days in the calendar year, or the income is paid by a resident or borne
by a PE in that country and the amount exceeds USD 4,000. See also
Agreement Between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil
and the Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes
on Income (5 Aug. 1991), Treaties IBFD.
105. Art. 14 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
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other evidence on the profession) issued by the competent tax authority of the residence country, and whether
the contract governing the provision of services indicates that the nature of the relationship is not one of employer and employee. A service provider is generally not
treated as an employee if: (1) he or she does not enjoy the
medical insurance, social insurance, paid vacations, overseas allowances and other benefits received by employees;
(2) his/her remuneration is referenced to hours, weeks or
months or paid in a lump sum; (3) the scope of the services is fixed or limited by a time period; (4) the service
provider is responsible for the quality of the work; and (5)
the service provider bears the cost and expenses related to
the performance of the contract.
4.5.3. Dependent personal services and corporate
directors
With regard to income from dependent personal services,
China’s tax treaties generally follow the OECD Model and
provide that the source country can tax the income where:
(1) the employee is present in that country for more than
183 days in a calendar year (or 12-month period); (2) the
employer is a resident in that country; or (3) the compensation is borne by the employer’s PE or fixed base located
in that country.
The meaning of the term “employer” is interpreted by the
SAT to be “the person having rights with regard to the
work produced and bearing the relative responsibility and
risks”.106 In the case of international hiring-out of labour,
the SAT requires a substance-over-form inquiry to determine the genuine relationship between the worker and the
Chinese enterprise that receives the services. The worker
may be an employee of the international hirer in form, but
is, in reality, an employee of the Chinese enterprise if the
Chinese enterprise that hires the services bears responsibilities and risks associated with the work performed by
the worker. Whether the Chinese enterprise is the employer depends on the circumstances, such as:107
– whether it has the authority to instruct the worker;
– whether the work is performed at a place that is under
the control and responsibility of the Chinese enterprise;
– whether the remuneration paid to the international
hirer is calculated on the basis of the time utilized by
the Chinese enterprise or whether the remuneration
is connected in some ways to the salary received by
the worker;
– whether tools and materials are put at the employee’s
disposal by the Chinese enterprise; and
– whether the number and qualifications of the worker
are not solely determined by the international hirer.
Directors’ fees and similar payments derived by a resident
of a treaty country as a member of the board of directors
of a company resident in a treaty country are taxable in
that country. Some of China’s tax treaties also adopt article
16(2) of the UN Model, for example, those with Canada,
106. Id., art.15.
107. Id., art.15.
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Kuwait, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and Thailand, extending the same rule to salaries, wages and other similar
remuneration derived by top-level managerial officials.108
4.5.4. Entertainers and athletes
Article 17 is the same in the two Models and is generally found in China’s tax treaties. It permits the source
country (where services are performed) to tax income
derived by entertainers and athletes whether the income
is paid directly to the entertainers or athletes or to corporations. However, where income is derived from activities exercised in accordance with a cultural exchange programme between China and the other country, the income
is exempt from tax in the source country.
4.5.5. Pensioners, students and professors
Article 18 deals with pensions. The OECD Model provides
that pensions are taxable only in the residence state of the
recipient. The UN Model provides for two alternatives.
Alternative A allows exclusive residence country taxation
with the exception of pensions and other payments made
under a public scheme, which is taxable only in the source
state. Alternative B allows the source country (where past
employment was performed) and the residence country
to share the taxation of pensions and similar payments,
with the exception of public pensions, which are taxable
only in the source country. China’s tax treaties are mixed
in terms of following the Models.109
Article 19 of the two Models allocates exclusive sourcebased taxation of remuneration paid in respect of government services. Such a provision is generally contained in
China’s tax treaties.
Under article 20 of the two Models, payments received by
visiting students and business trainees for the purpose of
their maintenance, education or training are not taxable
in the visiting state as long as the payments are received
from sources outside that state. China’s tax treaties follow
the Models and extend the principle to visiting teachers
and researchers.110
4.6. Other income
Income that is not specifically covered by any article of the
tax treaty (“other income”) is taxable only in the residence
country of the taxpayer under article 22 of the OECD
Model, but may be taxable in the source country under
article 21(3) of the UN Model.
China’s tax treaties with OECD Member countries tend
to follow the UN Model, whereas tax treaties with developing countries and transition countries tend to follow
the OECD Model.

108. Such income is taxable in China under the general provision with regard
to employment income, as the payer of the income is a company resident
in China.
109. For further discussion, see O. Gunther, W. Xing & J. Zhang, Employment
Income (Articles 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20 OECD Model), in Lang, Liu & Tang,
supra n. 27, at pp. 174-178.
110. Id., at pp. 182-184.
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4.7. Prevention of double taxation and tax sparing
Following the Models, China’s tax treaties require the
residence country to provide relief from double taxation.
Most tax treaties adopt the credit method, but some adopt
the exemption method111 or a combination of exemption
and credit method.112
A tax sparing credit is included in many of China’s earlier
tax treaties. It deems the source country’s tax that is “spared”
or “waived” to be “paid” for the purposes of the foreign tax
credit in the residence country. In tax treaties with developed countries, the tax sparing credit is often one-sided in
favour of China. For instance, under the former China–
United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (1984),113 the United
Kingdom allowed a credit for Chinese taxes which would
have been payable on business profits but for an exemption or reduction of tax under Chinese domestic law, i.e.
articles 5 and 6 of the Joint Venture Income Tax (JVIT)
Law (1980),114 article 3 of the JVIT Regulations, articles 4
and 5 of the FIET Law (1991), or any other similar special
incentive measures that are subsequently introduced by
the Chinese government.115 With regard to investment
income, Chinese tax is generally deemed to be paid at
the treaty rate irrespective of the amount of Chinese
tax actually paid.116 In a small number of tax treaties, a
two-way or reciprocal tax sparing credit is provided, such
as China’s tax treaties with Cyprus, Italy, Korea (Rep.),
Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan and Thailand. The
China–United States Income Tax Treaty (1986) does not
provide for tax sparing, which reflects US treaty policy,117
although the protocol nonetheless provides that it should
be promptly amended to incorporate a tax sparing credit
if the United States were to subsequently amend its laws
concerning the provision of tax sparing credits or agree
to grant such a relief to another country.118

111. For instance, business profits and most forms of personal service income,
if subject to tax in China, are exempt from tax in Belgium, France,
Germany, Norway and Sweden. The scope of the exemption varies from
tax treaty to tax treaty. Belgium exempts all income other than dividends,
interest and royalties; France and Germany add, to the non-exempt list,
capital gains, directors’ fees and the income of artists and athletes.
112. For instance, Agreement Between the People ’s Republic of China and the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
art. 24(2) (12 Mar. 1994), Treaties IBFD provides for an exemption
method for business profits and income for personal services and a credit
method for investment income.
113. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People ’s Republic of China
for the Reciprocal Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (26 July 1984),
Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.–U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984)].
114. JVIT Law, supra n. 5.
115. Art. 23(3) P.R.C.–U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984). Similar provisions are
contained in the tax treaties with Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
116. For instance, Chinese tax on dividends is deemed to have been paid at the
rate of 10% under the tax treaties with Canada (on shares representing
more than 25% equity), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
Singapore and Sweden.
117. See H.M. Liebman, A Formula for Tax-sparing Credits in United States Tax
Treaties with Developing Countries, 72 Am. J. Intl. L., p. 296 (1978).
118. P.R.C.–U.S. Income Tax Treaty, Exchange of Notes (30 Apr. 1984). This
compromise, giving “most favoured nation” treatment to China in this
regard, goes further than the United States has hitherto been prepared to
go.
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More recent tax treaties often either do not contain a tax
sparing clause or provide for a “sunset” requirement to
phase out the credit over a specified period of time (see
Table 6 in the Appendix). For example, the China–United
Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (2011)119 no longer contains
a tax sparing clause. Perhaps China sees less usefulness of
tax sparing in attracting foreign investment to China due
to the removal of tax incentives in domestic law.120 The
trend may also reflect the fact that China is a net capital
exporter with regard to many countries and a tax sparing
clause does not serve China’s interest. More importantly,
it may reflect China’s agreement with the OECD in respect
of the potential abuse of tax sparing clauses.121
5. Defending China’s Tax Base: Anti-Abuse
Measures
5.1. Overview
It is well accepted that the original purposes of tax treaties
are the prevention of double taxation and fiscal evasion.
There is no universal consensus on whether the prevention of tax avoidance is a principal purpose of tax treaties.
However, the most notable trend in China’s treaty policy
is to enhance anti-avoidance measures (see Table 6 in the
Appendix). These measures include:
– residence in a treaty country (see section 5.2.);
– LOB (see section 5.3.);
– associated enterprises (arm’s length principle) (see
section 5.4.);
– beneficial ownership (see section 5.5.);
– a general anti-treaty abuse rule (see section 5.6.); and
– a domestic GAAR (see section 5.7.).
5.2. Resident in a treaty country
As noted in section 3., China’s tax treaties apply only to
persons resident in China or the other treaty country.
Treaty benefits are denied if the residence test is not met.
In addition to the general definition of “person” and “resident” under articles 3 and 4, there are specific provisions
in some of China’s tax treaties that attempt to prevent
improper use of a tax treaty, such as treaty shopping or
using a treaty provision to achieve tax avoidance. For
instance, the China–Korea (Rep.) Income Tax Treaty

119. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People ’s Republic of China
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (27 June 2011),
Treaties IBFD.
120. Until the 2008 tax reform, Chinese domestic laws provided numerous
tax incentives to foreign-invested enterprises in China and foreign
portfolio investors. Under the normal tax credit system, however, only
taxes actually paid to the Chinese government are deductible from the
investor ’s tax in the home country. Consequently, the net result is that
taxes “spared” in China are paid instead to the home country and the
investor does not benefit from Chinese tax concessions. In order to
avoid this result, a tax sparing credit would deem the taxes exempted
or reduced as taxes paid for the purposes of the foreign tax credit in the
resident country. See J. Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and
Implications for International Tax Debates, 8 Fla. Tax Rev., pp. 670-712
(2007).
121. OECD, Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration (1999). The recommendations
were reflected in OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital:
Commentaries (29 Apr. 2000), Models IBFD.
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(1994),122 as amended by article 1 of the protocol (2006),
contains a provision that denies treaty benefits to companies (trusts or other entities) that would otherwise
qualify as residents of Korea (Rep.) (or China), but benefit
in Korea (Rep.) (or China) from a preferential tax regime
restricted to foreign-held companies. This clause is based
on paragraph 21.2 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the
OECD Model (2010):123
In respect of Article 1 of the Agreement, it is understood that the
Agreement shall not apply to any company, trust or other entity
that is a resident of a Contracting State and is beneficially owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons who
are not residents of that State, if the amount of the tax imposed
on the income of the company, trust or other entity by that State
(after taking into account any reduction or offset of the amount
of tax in any manner, including a refund, reimbursement, contribution, credit or allowance to the company, trust, or other entity
or to any other person) is substantially lower than the amount
that would be imposed by that State if all of the shares of the
capital stock of the company or all of the interests in the trust or
other entity, as the case may be, were beneficially owned by one or
more individuals who were residents of that State. However, this
paragraph shall not apply if 90 per cent or more of the income on
which the lower amount of tax is imposed is derived exclusively
from the active conduct of a trade or business carried on by it,
other than passive income from investment business.

Similarly, article 4(5) of the Australia–China Income Tax
Treaty (1988)124 denies the benefits under articles 10, 11
and 12 to a company if a company has become a resident
of a contracting state for the principal purpose of enjoying benefits under the tax treaty.
The SAT has given the term “resident of a Contracting
State” a purposive interpretation on the basis of substance
over form. Anti-avoidance is understood by the SAT to
be one of the purposes of a tax treaty. For instance, a Barbados company was denied the treaty exemption when
it was discovered that the company’s directors were residents of the United States and through exchange of information, the competent authority in Barbados confirmed
that the Barbados company did not meet the residency
requirement under Barbados law.125 Another example is
the SAT’s requirement of the purpose test in determining
the residence status under article 10 of the China–Hong

122. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the
Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income (28 Mar. 1994) (amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD.
123. A similar provision is contained in para. 21.2 of the UN Model:
Commentary on Article 1 (2011).
124. Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of
the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (17 Nov. 1988),
Treaties IBFD.
125. SAT, Guoshuihan [2008] No. 76, A Case of the Appropriate Handling of
Tax Treaty Abuse by the Xinjiang Yugur Autonomous Region State Tax
Bureau (30 Dec. 2008). For further discussion, see D. Qiu, China ’s Capital
Gains Taxation of Nonresidents and the Legitimate Use of Tax Treaties, Tax
Notes Intl. p. 593 (22 Nov. 2010) and H. Yang, New Developments in the
General Ant-Abuse Rules and the Impact on International Tax Planning, 15
Asia-Pac. Tax Bull. 3 (2009), Journals IBFD.
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Kong (2006)126 and China–Macau (2003)127 Income Tax
Agreements.128 In general, if a transaction or arrangement
was made for the principal purpose of obtaining favourable tax benefits under the tax treaty and the taxpayer
inappropriately obtained treaty benefits through such a
transaction or arrangement, the treaty benefits may be
denied. This approach seems to be influenced by a sample
provision suggested by paragraph 9.5 of the Commentary
on Article 1 of the OECD Model (2010):129
A guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to secure a
more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable
treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object
and purpose of the relevant provisions.

5.3. LOB
Neither the OECD Model nor the UN Model contains
an LOB article. However, the Commentary on Article 1
of the OECD Model (2010) (paragraph 20, reproduced
in paragraph 56 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the
UN Model (2011)) suggests language for such an article
if both contracting states are interested in such provision.
The LOB article is generally absent from China’s tax treaties, except for the China–United States (1986)130 and the
China–Mexico (2005)131 Income Tax Treaties. The LOB
clause in these tax treaties is substantially similar. Article
VI(1) and (2) of the protocol to the China–Mexico Income
Tax Treaty (2005) reads as follows:132
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a
Contracting State shall not be entitled under this Agreement
to relief from taxation in the other Contracting State unless:
(a) (i) more than 50% of the beneficial interest in such person (or in the case of a company more than 50% of
the number of shares of each class of the company’s
shares) is owned, directly or indirectly, by any combination of one or more of:
(A) Individuals who are residents of one of the Contracting States;
(B) Companies as described in subparagraph 1(b);
and
(C) One of the Contracting States, its political subdivisions or local authorities; and

126. Arrangement Between the Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income [unofficial
translation] (21 Aug. 2006), Treaties IBFD.
127. Arrangement Between the Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income [unofficial
translation] (27 Dec. 2003), Treaties IBFD.
128. SAT, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 81.
129. This is reproduced in para. 23 of the UN Model: Commentary on Article 1
(2011).
130. Protocol P.R.C.–U.S. Income Tax Treaty.
131. Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s Republic of China and
the Government of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income (12 Sept. 2005), Treaties IBFD.
132. The remainder of the article lists the recognized stock exchanges and
require the competent authorities to consult with each other before treaty
relief is denied under the LOB provision.
© IBFD

(ii) in the case of relief from taxation under Articles 10
(dividends), 11 (interest), and 12 (royalties), not more
than 50% of the gross income of such person is used
to make payments of dividends, interest and royalties to persons who are other than persons described
in clauses (A) through (C) of subparagraph (a)(i),
whether directly or indirectly; or
(b)

It is a company which is a resident of a Contracting State
and in whose principal class of shares there is substantial and regular trading on a recognized stock exchange.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the establishment, acquisition
and maintenance of such a person and the conduct of its operations did not have as a principal objective the purpose of
obtaining benefits under the Agreement.

According to this LOB provision, a resident of Mexico
does not qualify for treaty relief in China, unless it is a publicly traded company or a subsidiary of a resident individual or publicly traded company, or it is not a “steppingstone” device, i.e. not more than 50% of the gross income
is used to make payments of dividends, interest and royalties to residents of a third country, or it meets the business purpose exception.133
5.4. Associated enterprises (arm’s length principle)
The arm’s length principle codified in article 9(1) of the
OECD Model functions as an anti-avoidance rule in the
sense that the tax base of the source (or residence) country
cannot be eroded through transfer pricing. In determining the amount of profits attributable to a PE (or an associated enterprise), the amount paid to, or received from,
a related party must reflect the arm’s length price. Otherwise, the tax authorities have the power to redetermine
the amount.
In addition to article 9(1), articles 11(6) and 12(5) of the
UN Model build on the anti-avoidance focus by restricting the treaty rate on interest and royalties to the amount
that reflects the arm’s length price where the payer and
payee are in a “special relationship”.
Articles 9(1), 11(6) and 12(5) of the UN Model are generally reproduced in China’s tax treaties. The arm’s length
principle is found in Chinese domestic law.134 The SAT
regards the transfer pricing rule as one of the “special
adjustment rules” or anti-avoidance rules.135 In interpreting provisions based on articles 11(6) and 12(4) of the
OECD Model, the SAT requires that reference be made to
the relevant domestic anti-avoidance provisions and SAT
guidelines on the application of these rules.136

133. In order to enforce the LOB rule, the SAT requires the tax authorities-incharge to collect information in addition to the resident certificate when
considering whether to grant treaty benefits.
134. Art. 41 EIT. For further discussion of the transfer pricing rules in China,
see J. Li, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes – China Chapter, in Resolving
Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis (E. Baistrocchi & I. Roxan
eds., Cambridge U. Press forthcoming 2012) and Cao, supra n. 25, at pp.
317-344.
135. SAT, Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2, Measures for the Implementation of the
Special Tax Adjustment (trial) (1 Jan. 2009).
136. Arts. 11 and 12 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
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5.5. Beneficial ownership
The beneficial ownership rule in articles 10, 11 and 12 of
the two Models is universally included in China’s tax treaties. Under this rule, the reduced treaty rate of withholding
taxes on dividends, interest and royalties applies only to
“beneficial owners” who are resident in the treaty country.
The concept of “beneficial ownership” is not found in
Chinese domestic tax law. According to the SAT Guoshuihan [2009] No. 601137 a “beneficial owner” is a person who
has ownership of and control over an income or the rights
and assets generating the income, and is generally engaged
in substantial business activities. An agent or conduit
company is not a beneficial owner. A conduit company
is defined as one that is created for the purpose of avoiding
or reducing tax, or shifting or accumulating profits. It is
merely registered in a country to satisfy a legally required
organization form and does not carry on any substantial
business activities, such as production, trading and management.
Guoshuihan [2009] No. 601 also states that the meaning
of “beneficial owner” should not be given a literal interpretation or a domestic law meaning. Instead, it should
be interpreted in its context and in light of the object and
purpose of the tax treaty, including the purpose of preventing treaty abuse, and should be based on the relevant
facts and circumstances in accordance with the principle
of substance over form. A company (or trust) is not considered a beneficial owner if:
– it is obligated to pay or distribute all or a substantial portion (60% or more) of the income within a
specified period of time (for example, 12 months) of
receiving the income;
– it has no or little business activity other than owning
the assets or rights that generate the income;
– its assets, scale of operations or number of employees
are relatively small and not commensurate with the
amount of income it receives;
– it has no, or almost no, right of control or disposition
over, the income or the assets or rights that generate
the income and bears no or very little risk;
– its income is taxed at a zero or very low effective tax
rate in the other treaty country;

137. Guoshuihan [2009] No. 601, Notice on Interpretation and Determination
of “Beneficial Owner” under Tax Treaties (17 Oct. 2009). In many ways,
the SAT interpretation is broader than, the principles articulated in court
decisions in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom in, for example,
UK: CA, 2 Mar. 2006, Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank NA [2006] E.W.C.A. Civ. 158, S.T.L. 1195, Tax Treaty Case
Law IBFD; FR:CE, 29 Dec. 2006, Ministre de L’Economie, des Finances et
de L’Industrie v. Societe Bank of Scotland, no. 283314. See 9 1TLR 1, Tax
Treaty Case Law IBFD; and CA: TC, 22 Apr. 2008, Prévost Car Inc. v.
Her Majesty the Queen, 2008 3080 (TCC), Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD,
affirmed by CA: FCA, 26 Feb. 2009, Prévost Car Inc. v. Her Majesty the
Queen, DTC 5053, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. For further discussion, see
J. Li, “Beneficial Ownership” in Tax Treaties: Judicial Interpretation and the
Case for Clarity in Essays in Honour of John F. Avery Jones: Tax Polymath:
A Life in International Taxation (P. Baker & C. Bobbett eds., IBFD 2010),
Online Books IBFD and N. Sharkey, China ’s Tax Treaties and Beneficial
Ownership: Innovative Control of Treaty Shopping or Inferior Law-Making
Damaging to International Law?, 65 Bull. Intl Taxn. 12 (2011), Journals
IBFD.

470

BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SEPTEMBER 2012

–

–

its loan contract on which the interest arises is part
of a “back-to-back” loan arrangement, i.e. the owner
of the loan has a loan or deposit contract with third
parties with similar amounts of principal, interest rate
and time of conclusion of the contract; and
the licensor to an agreement on copyright, patent
and technology licensing or transfer has a contract
to license or transfer the property from a third party.

5.6. General anti-treaty abuse rule
Neither Model currently contains a general anti-abuse
provision. However, the Commentary on Article 1 of
the OECD Model (2003)138 and Commentary on Article
1 of the UN Model (2011) suggest sample provisions to
be used in bilateral negotiations. For instance, paragraph
21.4 of the OECD Commentary suggests the following to
deal with source taxation of specific types of income under
articles 10, 11, 12 and 21:139
The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was the main
purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned
with the creation or assignment of the [Article 10: “shares or other
rights”; Article 11: “debt-claim”; Articles 12 and 21: “Rights”] in
respect of which the [Article 10: “dividend”; Article 11: “interest”;
Articles 12 “royalties” and Article 21: “income”] is paid to take
advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.

Some of China’s tax treaties that were concluded after
2006, such as the tax treaties with Belgium, Finland, Malta,
Singapore and the United Kingdom, contain the above
provision in articles 11 and 12. The SAT regards this type
of provision as providing a basis for the applicable tax authority of the source country to prevent treaty abuse.140
However, as discussed in section 5.7., the absence of such
explicit provision does not preclude the SAT from challenging treaty shopping under other anti-abuse rules,
including the domestic GAAR.
5.7. Domestic GAAR
There are no articles in the OECD Model or UN Model
that explicitly allow treaty benefits to be denied by invoking a domestic GAAR. However, paragraphs 9.5 and 21.2
of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model
(2010) and paragraphs 34 to 37 of the Commentary on
Article 1 of the UN Model (2011) suggest the inclusion
of such an explicit rule in a tax treaty. The UN Commentary (2011) advises that “the use of such a provision would
probably be considered primarily by countries that have
found it difficult to counter improper uses of tax treaties
through other approaches”.141
China’s tax treaties concluded before 2006 do not contain
any provisions that allow the use of a domestic GAAR to
counter treaty abuse. The domestic GAAR in China was

138. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on
Article 1 (28 Jan. 2003), Models IBFD.
139. The OECD Commentary on Article 1 has been evolving since 1992. See
also para. 22 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model (2001) and
para. 23 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model (2011).
140. Art. 1 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
141. Para. 37 UN Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2011).
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enacted in 2007 and became effective on 1 January 2008. 142
Some post-2006 tax treaties include such a provision (see
Table 6 in the Appendix). For instance, article 26 of the
China–Singapore Income Tax Treaty (2007) states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of each Contracting State to apply its domestic laws and measures concerning the prevention of tax avoidance, whether or not described
as such, insofar as they do not give rise to taxation contrary to
the Agreement.

Article 26 clearly authorizes the competent tax authorities
to apply their respective GAAR to residents of the other
country, so long as the resulting taxation is not inconsistent with the tax treaty.
In practice, however, it appears to be clear that an explicit
GAAR article in a tax treaty is included for the purposes
of greater certainty. The absence of such a provision in a
tax treaty does not mean that the GAAR is not relied on
by the Chinese tax authorities. The tax authorities may
instigate a GAAR investigation on any enterprise that is
suspected of treaty abuse, of abuse of the corporate form,
of tax avoidance using tax havens or entering into other
arrangements without a reasonable business purpose.143
The tax authorities also adopt the substance-over-form
principle in determining whether or not an enterprise has
a tax avoidance arrangement and consider the following
factors:144
– the form and substance of an arrangement;
– the creation time and implementation period of an
arrangement;
– the implementation method of an arrangement;
– the relationship between each of the steps or components of an arrangement;
– the changes in each party’s financial situation
involved in an arrangement; and
– the tax consequences of an arrangement.
The SAT has applied the GAAR (especially the substanceover-form principle) in taxing non-resident enterprises
that have alienated shares of an offshore holding company
that held shares in Chinese operating companies. For
example, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 698 requires an offshore company to report to the tax authorities in charge
of a transaction involving a Chinese non-resident alienating shares of the company to another non-resident where
the actual tax rate of alienator’s residence country is less
than 12.5% or if the alienator’s gains from the transaction
are tax-free in the residence country. On the basis of the
information reported, the tax authorities in charge, after
seeking the approval of the SAT, may apply the substanceover-form principle and look through the intermediate
holding company in determining the Chinese source of
the gains from the alienation of the shares. The substance142. Art. 47 EIT Law and Art. 120 EIT Regulations. For discussion on this
topic, see J. Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study
of the Chinese and Canadian GAAR (2009) 11 Theoretical Inquiries in
L. 2, pp. 75-105 (2009) and D. Buss et al., China: Will It Challenge Tax
Motivated Treaty Shopping Structuring?, 86 Tax Mag., p. 13 (2008).
143. Art. 92 Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2, supra n. 135.
144. Id., art. 92. In conducting a GAAR investigation, the tax authorities
may request the instigators of the tax avoidance arrangement to provide
relevant materials and supporting evidence.
© IBFD

over-form principle applies when all of the following three
conditions are met: (1) there is an abuse of the company
form; (2) there is no bona fide commercial reason for the
indirect sale of the shares in a Chinese company; and (3)
the transaction would otherwise result in the avoidance
of Chinese tax.
A number of transactions involving indirect transfers of
shares of Chinese companies were assessed and claims for
treaty exemption were denied. The tax treaties that were
relied on by taxpayers include treaties with Singapore,145
Hong Kong,146 Barbados147 and other jurisdictions.148
For instance, the tax authorities in Xuzhou denied treaty
exemption claimed by a resident of Barbados in respect
of the gains realized in 2009 from the alienation of shares
of a Chinese real estate company. At the time of the transaction, the China–Barbados Income Tax Treaty (2000)149
did not contain an equivalent of article 13(4) of the UN
Model that allowed the source country to tax gains from
the alienation of shares of companies whose value is
derived principally from immovable property located in
China (such a provision was added in the 2010 Protocol).
Relying on article 4 of the tax treaty, the Barbadian residence of the alienator was denied on the grounds that the
company failed to prove that its place of effective management was actually in Barbados.150
Another example of possible reliance on domestic GAAR
in denying treaty benefits is illustrated by the following
case.151 A company resident in Luxembourg held 25% of
the shares in a Chinese resident company and acquired one
additional share in the same Chinese resident company
immediately prior to the distribution of dividends by the
Chinese company. The Luxembourg company was wholly
owned by another Chinese company based in Jinan, China
(in other words, the Luxembourg company was an offshore company owed by a Chinese enterprise). The withholding tax rate under the China–Luxembourg Income
145. For instance, in 2008, the Chongqing tax office reassessed a Singapore
resident company on the gains realized from the alienation of another
Singaporean company that held a 31.6% equity interest in a Chinese
company located in Chongqing. The transaction took place before the
introduction of the domestic GAAR and the inclusion of the GAAR
article in the P.R.C.–Sing. Income and Capital Tax Treaty. Without
explicitly relying on either the domestic GAAR or the treaty provision,
the tax office appeared to rely on the general spirit behind the anti-abuse
rules in denying the treaty exemption claimed by the Singapore company.
146. For instance, a Hong Kong resident company was reassessed by Yangzhou
tax office on the gains realized from the sale of its shares of a Chinese
public company to a US resident. See X. Yunxiang, Z. Jun & S. Yan, The
Biggest Tax Revenue on a Single Indirect Transfer of Shares Conducted by
Non-Residents, China Taxn. News (9 June 2010) (in Chinese).
147. See S. Yan, C. He & X. Yunxiang, The First Case Xuzhou Tax Authority
Refused the Abuse of Tax of Tax Treaty, China Taxn. News (24 Feb. 2010)
(in Chinese). See also the official website of the Xuzhou government on 23
February 2010 at www.xz.gov.cn/zwgk/bmxx/20100223/09194237285.
html (in Chinese).
148. Some of the cases occurred even before the GAAR was enacted.
For further discussion of the highly controversial practice of the tax
authorities in assessing indirect transfers of shares of Chinese companies,
see D. Qiu, China ’s Capital Gains Taxation of Nonresidents and the
Legitimate Use of Tax Treaties, Tax Notes Intl., p.593 (22 Nov. 2010).
149. Agreement Between the Government of Barbados and the Government of
the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (15 May 2000),
Treaties IBFD.
150. See Qiu, supra n. 148, at pp. 620-621.
151. The China Tax News (31 Aug. 2011) (in Chinese).
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and Capital Tax Treaty (1994)152 is 5% for direct dividends
and 10% for portfolio dividends. In order to qualify for
direct dividends, the equity ownership must be more than
25%. The Jinan State Tax Bureau denied the treaty benefit
on the grounds that the Luxembourg company had not
held its interest in the dividend-paying company for 12
months before the dividend declaration. The “12-month
holding period” requirement was omitted from article 10
of the tax treaty, but referred to in the SAT circular regarding the implementation of treaty dividend provisions.153
The acquisition of the one additional share was also likely
to be considered to be offensive from the perspective of
the GAAR.
5.8. The role of Hong Kong
While the SAT is increasingly concerned with treaty abuse,
China is, at the same time, growing its treaty network.
What is also interesting to note is that Hong Kong has
also begun developing its treaty network (see Table 7 in the
Appendix). The combination of the China-Hong Kong
Income Tax Arrangement (2006) and Hong Kong’s treaty
network presents attractive tax planning opportunities for
investors and potential treaty abuse situations for the tax
authorities. Hong Kong’s treaty partners include not only
major capital exporting countries, such as France, Japan
and the United Kingdom, but also some treaty-based tax
havens, such as Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine and
compare Hong Kong’s tax treaties with China’s tax treaties.154 It is sufficient to note that Hong Kong’s tax treaties generally follow the OECD Model, and adopt a nil
or very low rate of withholding tax on dividends, interest
and royalties.
In terms of the source-country taxation of capital gains,
gains from the alienation of shares deriving their value
principally from immovable property are taxed in the
source country (article 13(4) of the UN Model), but gains
from the alienation of shares of other companies are generally not taxable in the source country (article 13(5) of the
UN Model). As such, Hong Kong’s position as a gateway
to China is strengthened by its tax treaties. This is particularly the case when an investor’s home country does
not have a tax treaty with China, or has a treaty that provides for higher withholding tax rates or a broader scope
of source country taxation.
The use of a Hong Kong company as a vehicle for investment in China is subject to the scrutiny of Chinese tax
authorities when treaty benefits are claimed. The antiavoidance measures, discussed in sections 5.6. and 5.7.,
152. Agreement Between the People ’s Republic of China and the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (12 Mar.
1994), Treaties IBFD.
153. SAT Guishuihan [2009] No. 81.
154. For an overview, see S. Cho, The Mainland of China and the Hong Kong
SAR Double Taxation Arrangement – An Overview and Implications for Tax
Planning, 34 Intl. Tax J., p. 45 (2008) and J. Vanderwolk, Hong Kong ’s New
Tax Treaty Network, 9 eJournal of Tax Research, p. 254 (2011).

472

BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SEPTEMBER 2012

all potentially apply in determining the entitlement of the
China–Hong Kong Income Tax Arrangement (2006).
The use of a Hong Kong company as a financing vehicle by
mainland Chinese companies gives rise to additional tax
issues, such as the residence of the company for Chinese
tax purposes. As discussed in section 3.3., if the place of
effective management of a Hong Kong company is in
Mainland China, the company is regarded as a Chinese
resident. One of the implications of such a status is that
the company is entitled to benefits under China’s tax treaties. On the other hand, the disposalition of shares of the
Hong Kong company by offshore investors may give rise
to Chinese capital gains tax because the source of the gains
is determined by the residence of the company.
6. Patterns and Trends in China’s Treaty Policy
6.1. General patterns
This study of the selected tax treaties shows some notable
patterns and trends in China’s tax treaties and treaty practice. One notable pattern is the influence of the OECD
Model and Commentaries and the UN Model and Commentaries. Such influence goes beyond the incorporation
of the provisions of the Models. Some concepts, principles and approaches in the Commentaries have also been
adopted into Chinese tax treaties and treaty practice. For
instance, the attribution of ownership of shares of related
companies or persons to the taxpayer that alienates shares
in a Chinese company is probably inspired by a similar
view found in paragraph 11 of the Commentary on Article
13(5) of the UN Model (2011):
It will be up to the law of the State imposing the tax to determine
which transactions give rise to a gain on the alienation of shares
and how to determine the level of holdings of the alienator, in
particular, how to determine an interest held indirectly. An indirect holding in this context may include ownership by related
persons that is imputed to the alienator. Anti-avoidance rules of
the law of the State imposing the tax may also be relevant in determining the level of the alienator’s direct or indirect holdings.

Another pattern is that China’s tax treaties with OECD
Member countries tend to have a broader scope of source
taxation than those with non-OECD countries, especially
in the case of business profits. There are no discernible differences between tax treaties with treaty haven countries
and other tax treaty countries, in terms of the scope of
source taxation of dividends, interest and royalties. There
is also a notable pattern of adopting anti-abuse rules in
more recent tax treaties with countries that have a more
sophisticated tax law system and are capital exporters to
China.
Finally, there are significant differences between tax treaties concluded before and after the major reform instigated by the EIT Law (2007), which reduced the standard
tax rate, abolished most of the tax incentives and introduced the GAAR and specific anti-avoidance rules, such
as thin capitalization and CFC rules.
In terms of treaty policy, there appears to be a general
shift away from taking the stance of a net capital importer
country. This is evidenced by the removal of the tax
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sparing clause in the majority of renegotiated tax treaties
and reducing the rate of withholding tax rate on direct
dividends to 5%.
6.2. Scaling down source taxation of business profits
On the basis of the data in Table 5 in the Appendix, compared to the earlier set of tax treaties with OECD Member
countries, such as those with Japan (1983), the United
States (1984), Denmark (1986) and Australia (1988), the
scope of source country taxation of business profits is narrower in tax treaties with transition countries and developing countries, as well as in tax treaties renegotiated after
2006.
The definition of PE is narrower in tax treaties with nonOECD countries or lower-income OECD countries, such
as Mexico. This is evidenced by specifying a longer period
of time for supervisory services to constitute a PE (12
months as opposed to six months). The tax treaties with
Georgia, Greece, Mexico and Syria do not even follow
article 5(3)(b) of the UN Model. The PE definition is also
narrower by not deeming an independent agent to constitute a PE under article 5(7), examples of which are tax treaties with Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Georgia,
Finland (2010) and Mexico.
The limitation on deductions in attributing profits to a PE
under article 7(3) of the UN Model was included in the
earlier tax treaties, for example, the United States (1984),
Denmark (1986), Australia (1988), the Netherlands (1987)
and Malaysia (1985), but missing in most other tax treaties
covered by this study. The only tax treaties that contain the
limitation rule were those with Mexico (2005), Kazakhstan (2002), Cyprus (1990) and Hong Kong (2006).
The trend of scaling down source taxation of business
profits indicates a shift in China’s interest in defining
and defending its tax base. During the earlier years, China
was a net capital importer and was, therefore, interested
in having a broader scope for source taxation. This is
particularly the case with major OECD Member countries. In more recent years, China has become a capital
exporting country. Even with the major OECD Member
countries, while China remains a net capital-importer,
China’s investment in these countries increased, presumably resulting in more two-way traffic. As such, the
policy concerns over source-based taxation remain, but
to a lesser extent. With regard to non-OECD countries,
China is often a net capital exporter and would be expected
to distant itself from the UN Model and bargain for narrower source country taxation. In practice, however,
China’s tax treaties with non-OECD countries still follow
the UN Model, although to a lesser degree compared to
the tax treaties with the OECD Member countries. This is
perhaps due to China’s understanding of the position of
capital-importing countries and, consequently, China was
more willing to accommodate their concerns than typical
OECD Member countries.

6.3. Strengthening source taxation over passive
income and capital gains
As indicated in Table 5 in the Appendix, China’s tax treaties follow a clear pattern of withholding tax rates under
articles 10, 11 and 12. The rate is generally capped at 10%
and not reduced, even in tax treaties with the “treaty
haven” jurisdictions. Other than the 5% rate on direct dividends, there is no systematic difference across countries
or across time. Accordingly, the level of withholding tax
rates indicates a reduction in the scope of source taxation
rather than strengthening it. However, if the anti-abuse
rules (beneficial ownership and the excessive interest and
royalty provision under articles 11(6) and 12(5) of the UN
Model) are taken into account, the effect is strengthening
source taxation of passive income.
In the case of capital gains, there is a clear trend in strengthening source taxation by incorporating article 13(4)
(shares deriving value primarily from immovable property) and article 13(5) (direct shares) of the UN Model.
While the earlier tax treaties with Denmark, Japan and
the United States do not include these provisions, subsequent tax treaties generally incorporate one or both. For
instance, article 13(4) is contained in all of the selected tax
treaties, with the exception of those with Brazil, Brunei,
Cuba, the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Syria and Turkmenistan and article 13(5) is included in most tax treaties with tax havens (Luxembourg
(1994), Mauritius (1994) and Barbados (2011)) and renegotiated tax treaties.
6.4. Aggressive stance on treaty abuse
Prior to 2006, the only general anti-abuse provision was
the LOB provision contained in the tax treaties with
Mexico and the United States. Since 2006, each renegotiated tax treaty contains one or both of the provisions codifying a business purpose type of a general anti-abuse rule
or the use of a domestic GAAR in countering treaty abuse
(see Table 6 in the Appendix). These provisions are based
on the provisions suggested in the OECD Commentary
and/or UN Commentary as opposed to provisions in the
Models per se. In this respect, China can be considered
an early adopter of such provisions or a mover of an antitreaty abuse trend.
6.5. Some explanatory factors
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully discuss the
internal and external factors that may help explain the
trends and patterns noted in sections 6.1. to 6.5. A few
highlights may suffice. One factor is China’s rise as an
economic power. The world ranking of China’s GDP
was ninth in 1980, fifth in 2005, and second in 2010.155
Inbound FDI into China was valued at USD 916 million
in 1983 and USD 11,6011 million in 2011.156 Outbound
155. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,
available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/
download.aspx.
156. Source: www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/wstztj/lywztj/t20120119_140560.
htm).
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FDI was valued at USD 93 million in 1983 and USD 60,070
million in 2011.157
A second factor is the importance of taxation in China.
The amount of tax revenue was CNY 77,560 million in
1983 and CNY 8,972,031 million in 2011. In 1983, the
idea of income taxation was novel, affecting very few companies and individuals. In 2011, it was one of the reasons
why the Chinese complain about “tax misery”.158
A third factor is the growing sophistication of Chinese tax
policy, legislation and administration. Chinese income tax
policy was transformed from one that aimed at facilitating
the transition from a centrally planned economy to one
that aims at neutrality and equity demanded by a marketbased economy. If the number of articles in the tax law
is any indication of sophistication, the evidence is clear,
i.e. the JVIT Law (1980) contains 18 articles and 1,302
words (excluding the Title of the legislation), whereas
the EIT Law (2007) contains 60 articles and 5,345 words.
The SAT interpretation bulletins and administrative measures, such as the Treaty Interpretation Circular, demonstrate an impressive degree of understanding of the technical issues and policy implications.
Some external factors presumably have also affected
China’s treaty policy. These include: the updates of the
OECD Model and Commentary, as well as the UN Model
and Commentary in the 1990s and 2000s, the growing
awareness of aggressive tax planning strategies and the
revenue effect of income shifting to low-tax jurisdictions and China’s participation in the development of
the Models, in joining the Joint International Tax Shelter
Information Centre (JITSIC) and other organizations.
157. Source: www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20120119_140581.
htm). Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/
reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en. The increase
in outbound FDI was considered a main reason behind China ’s change
of treaty policy with regard to art. 7(3). See J. Khoo, China ’s Evolution as a
Capital Exporter: A Shift in Tax Treaty Policy?, 37 Hong Kong L. J., p. 891
(2007).
158. See, for example, How Should We Look at the Tax Burden?, Beijing Rev. 43
(27 Oct. 2011), available at www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2011-10/24/
content_400222_2.htm and Mainland ’s “tax misery” highest in region:
Forbes, The China Post (27 Sept. 2011), available at www.chinapost.com.
tw/business/asia-china/2011/09/27/317884/Mainlands-tax.htm.
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7. Conclusions
This study of selected Chinese tax treaties and the
treaty interpretation supports the claim that the
treaty network plays an important role in defining
and defending China’s tax base. The network
consists of close to 100 tax treaties that have
been concluded since 1983. It could be said that
China’s treaty network functions as a Great Fiscal
Wall of China. Even though China’s tax treaties
are based on the OECD Model and UN Model,
they have some distinguishing features that start
to give shape to a Chinese identity.
In an article published in 1998,159 Brian Arnold
and the author predicted that “[o]wing to its
increasing importance in the world economy
and growing sophistication of the Chinese tax
system, China will likely play an important
role in shaping the international tax norms in
the next century”.160 Such a view is shared by
other commentators.161 This article presents
evidence that China is no longer just a norm
taker, but a norm mover, especially in respect
of treaty abuse issues. In this sense, elements of
China’s tax treaties will most likely find their way
into tax treaties concluded by other countries.
Interestingly, while the iconic Great Wall cannot
be duplicated by other countries, the Great Fiscal
Wall of China can be.

159. Arnold & Li, supra n. 27.
160. Id., at p. 87.
161. See, for example, Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at p. 78.
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Appendix
Table 1: Overview of China’s Tax Treaties (as at 31 January 2012)
Treaty partners
Countries (year of conclusion)
OECD Member countries
Japan (1983); the United States (1984); France (1984); the United Kingdom (1984,
2011); Belgium (1985, 2009); Germany (1985); Norway (1986); Denmark (1986); Canada
(1986, 2012); Finland (1986, 2010); Sweden (1986); New Zealand (1986); Italy (1986); the
Netherlands (1987); the Czech Republic (1987, 2010); the Slovak Republic (1997); a Poland
(1988); Australia (1988); Switzerland (1990); Spain (1990); Austria (1991); Hungary (1992);
Luxembourg (1994); Korea (Rep.) (1994); Slovenia (1995); Israel (1995); Turkey (1995); Iceland
(1996); Portugal (1998); Estonia (1998); Ireland (2000); Greece (2002); and Mexico (2005).
Other BRICs
Brazil (1991); Russia (1994); and India (1994).
Transition countries (other than
Bulgaria (1989); Romania (1991); Croatia (1995); Belarus (1995); Vietnam (1995); Ukraine
OECD Member countries)
(1995); Armenia (1996); Lithuania (1996); Latvia (1996); Uzbekistan (1996); Yugoslavia (1997);
Macedonia (1997); Laos (1999); Moldova (2000); Kazakhstan (2001); Kyrgyzstan (2002);
Albania (2004); Azerbaijan (2005); Georgia (2005); Tajikistan (2008); and Turkmenistan (2009).
Treaty havens (non-OECD)
Cyprus (1990); Mauritius (1994); Barbados (2000, 2011); and Morocco (2002).
Developing countries
Malaysia (1985); Thailand (1986); Kuwait (1989); Pakistan (1989); Mongolia (1991); Malta
(1993, 2010); United Arab Emirates (1993); Papua New Guinea (1994); Jamaica (1996);
Bangladesh (1996); Sudan (1997); Egypt (1997); Seychelles (1999); the Philippines (1999);
South Africa (2000); Qatar (2001); Cuba (2001); Venezuela (2001); Nepal (2001); Indonesia
(2001); Oman (2002); Nigeria (2002); Tunis (2002); Iran (2002); Bahrain (2002); Sri Lanka
(2003); Trinidad and Tobago (2003); Brunei (2004); Saudi Arabia (2006); Algeria (2006);
Singapore (1986; 2007); Ethiopia (2009); Zambia (2010); and Syria (2010).
Special Administrative Regions
Hong Kong (1998, 2006, 2010); and Macau (2003, 2009).
Note a: The Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes On Income (11 June 1987), Treaties IBFD, applied to the Slovak Republic.

Table 2: Tax treaties selected for research
Type of treaty partner
OECD Member countries

Other BRICs

Transition economies

Treaty havens (OECD Member and other
countries)

Developing countries

Renegotiated tax treaties
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Country
Japan
United States
United Kingdom
Canada
Australia
Greece
Mexico
Brazil
Russia
India
Bulgaria
Croatia
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Turkmenistan

Year of conclusion
1983
1984
1984
1986
1988
2002
2005
1991
1994
1994
1989
1995
2002
2005
2009

Netherlands
Luxembourg
Mauritius
Barbados
Malaysia
Papua New Guinea
Sudan
Cuba
Brunei
Syria
Singapore
Belgium
Finland
Malta
United Kingdom

1987
1994
1994
2000
1985
1994
1997
2001
2004
2010
1986, 2007
1985, 2009
1986, 2010
1993, 2010
1984, 2010
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Table 3: Overview of relevant provisions of the UN Model and Commentaries
UN Model/Commentary
Subject matter
Business profits
Article 5(2)
Deemed PE if building site and supervisory activities last more than six months
Article 5(3)(b)
Deemed services PE if activities last more than six months
Article 5(6)
Deemed PE if insurance premiums are collected or risks situated in the source
country
Article 5(7)
Deemed PE if the activities of an independent agent are devoted wholly or
almost wholly on behalf of the enterprise
Article 7(3)
Limitations on deduction of expenses in attributing profits to a PE
Investment income, capital gains and other income
Article 10(2)
Lower rate for direct dividends
Article 11(2)
Withholding tax rate
Article 12(2)
Source-country taxation of royalties
Article 12(3)
“Royalties” include equipment rental
Articles 11(6) and 12(5)
Amount of interest and/or royalty in excess of the arm’s length not eligible for
treaty rate
Article 13(4)
Gains from the alienation of shares deriving value principally from immovable
property are taxable in the source country
Article 13(5)
Gains from the alienation of “direct shares” (if alienator owns more than the
specified percentage of equity in the company) are taxable in the resident
country of the company
Article 21(3)
“Other income” may be taxable in the source country
Anti-Abuse
Articles 10, 11 and 12
Beneficial owners resident in the other treaty country are entitled to reduced
rates of withholding taxes
Article 9 and Articles 11(6) and 12(5)
Arm’s length principle
Paragraph 56, Commentary on Article 1
Limitation on benefits
Paragraph 36, Commentary on Article 1
Denying treaty benefits where the main purpose is to obtain such benefits
Paragraph 21, Commentary on Article 1
Domestic GAAR may be applied in denying treaty benefits
Table 4: Articles 5 and 7 of the UN Model in selected Chinese tax treaties
Type of treaty
Country
Article 5(3)
PE services
partner
supervisory
activity
OECD Member
countries

Other BRICs

Transition
countries

Treaty havens
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Japan (1983)
United States (1984)
Denmark (1986)
Australia (1988)
Switzerland (1990)
Greece (2002)
Mexico (2005)
Brazil (1991)
Russia (1994)
India (1994)
Bulgaria (1989)
Croatia (1995)
Kazakhstan (2002)
Georgia (2005)
Turkmenistan (2009)
Netherlands (1987)
Cyprus (1990)
Luxembourg (1994)
Mauritius (1994)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (12 months)
Yes
Yes
Yes (18 months)
Yes (183 days)
Yes
Yes (12 months)
Yes (12 months)
Yes
Yes (12 months)
Yes
Yes (12 months)
Yes
Yes (12 months)
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Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes (18 months)
Yes (183 days)
Yes
Yes (12 months)
Yes (12 months)
No
Yes (183 days)
Yes
Yes (12 months)
Yes
Yes (12 months)

Article 5(7)
deemed
dependent
Agent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Article 5(6)
insurance

Article 7(3)
limits on
deduction

No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
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Table 4: Articles 5 and 7 of the UN Model in selected Chinese tax treaties
Type of treaty
Country
Article 5(3)
PE services
Article 5(7)
Article 5(6)
Article 7(3)
partner
supervisory
deemed
insurance
limits on
activity
dependent
deduction
Agent
Developing
Malaysia (1985)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
countries
Sudan (1997)
Yes (18 months) Yes (12 months) Yes
No
No
Cuba (2001)
Yes (12 months) Yes (12 months) Yes
No
No
Brunei (2004)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Syria (2010)
Yes (9 months)
No
Yes
No
No
Renegotiated tax Hong Kong (1998)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
treaties
Hong Kong (2006)
Yes
Yes (183 days)
Yes
No
Yes
Singapore (1986)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Singapore (2007)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Belgium (1985)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Belgium (2009)
Yes (12 months) Yes (183 days)
Yes
No
No
Finland (1986)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Finland (2010)
Yes
Yes (183 days)
No
Yes
No
Malta (1993)
Yes (8 months)
Yes (8 months)
Yes
No
No
Malta (2010)
Yes (12 months) Yes (183 days)
Yes
No
No
Barbados (2000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Barbados (2011)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
United Kingdom (1984) Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
United Kingdom (2011) Yes (12 months) Yes (183 days)
Yes
No
No
Table 5: Source-country taxation of dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains and other income (UN Model)
Type of treaty partner
Country
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
10(2)
11(2) and 12(2) (%) 13(4)
13(5)
(%)
(3) (%)
OECD Member countries
Japan (1983)
10
10, 0
10
No
No
United States (1984)
10
10, 0
10, 7
No
No
Denmark (1986)
10
10, 0
10, 7
No
No
Australia (1988)
15
10
10
Yes
No
Switzerland (1990)
10
10, 0
10, 6
Yes
No
Greece (2002)
5, 10
10, 0
10
Yes
No
Mexico (2005)
5
10, 0
10
No
No
Other BRICs
Brazil (1991)
15
15, 0
25, 15
No
No
Russia (1994)
10
10, 0
10
Yes
Yes
India (1994)
10
10, 0
10
Yes
No
Transition countries
Bulgaria (1989)
10
10, 0
10, 7
Yes
No
Croatia (1995)
5
10, 0
10
Yes
Yes
Kazakhstan (2002)
0, 5, 10
10, 0
5
No
No
Georgia (2005)
10
10, 0
10
Yes
No
Turkmenistan (2009)
5, 10
10, 0
10
No
No
Treaty havens
Netherlands (1987)
10
10, 0
10, 6
No
No
Luxembourg (1994)
5, 10
10, 0
10, 6
Yes
Yes
Mauritius (1994)
5
10, 0
10
Yes
Yes
Barbados (2010)
5, 10
10, 0
10
Yes
Yes
Developing countries
Malaysia (1985)
10
10, 0
10, 15
Yes
No
Sudan (1997)
5
10, 0
10
Yes
Yes
Cuba (2001)
5, 10
10, 0
7.5, 0
No
No
Brunei (2004)
5
10, 0
10
No
No
Syria (2010)
5, 10
10, 0
10
No
No
Special administrative regions Hong Kong (1998)
10
10
10
No
No
Hong Kong (2006)
5, 10
7, 0
7
Yes
Yes
Macau (2003, 2009)
5, 10
7, 0
10
Yes
Yes
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Article
21(3)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
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Table 5: Source-country taxation of dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains and other income (UN Model)
Type of treaty partner
Country
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
10(2)
11(2) and 12(2) (%) 13(4)
13(5)
(%)
(3) (%)
Renegotiated tax treaties
Singapore (1986)
12, 7
7, 10, 0
10
Yes
No
Singapore (2007)
5, 10
7, 10, 0
10
Yes
Yes
Belgium (1985)
10
5, 10
10, 6
Yes
Yes
Belgium (2009)
5, 10
5, 10
7
Yes
Yes
Finland (1986)
10
10, 0
10
Yes
No
Finland (2010)
5, 10
5, 10
10
Yes
Yes
Malta (1993)
Corporate 10, 0
10
Yes
Yes
tax rate
Malta (2010)
5, 10
10, 0
10, 7
Yes
Yes
United Kingdom (1984) 10
10, 0
10, 6
No
No
United Kingdom (2011) 5, 15, 10
10, 0
10, 6
Yes
Yes
Table 6: Anti-abuse rules and tax sparing in selected Chinese tax treaties
Type of treaty partner
Country
Tax
Beneficial Excessive
sparing
owner
amount
OECD Member countries

Other BRICs

Transition countries

Treaty havens

Developing countries

Renegotiated tax treaties
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Japan (1983)
United States (1984)
Denmark (1986)
Switzerland (1990)
Mexico (2005)
Brazil (1991)
Russia (1994)
India (1994)
Bulgaria (1989)
Croatia (1995)
Kazakhstan (2002)
Georgia (2005)
Turkmenistan (2009)
Netherlands (1987)
Luxembourg (1994)
Mauritius (1994)
Barbados (2000, 2010)
Malaysia (1985)
Sudan (1997)
Cuba (2001)
Brunei (2004)
Syria (2010)
Hong Kong (1998)
Hong Kong (2006)
Singapore (1986)
Singapore (2007)
Belgium (1985)
Belgium (2009)
Finland (1986)
Finland (2010)
Malta (1993)
Malta (2010)
United Kingdom (1984)
United Kingdom (2011)
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Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

General
antiabuse rule
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

LOB
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Article
21(3)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Application
of domestic
GAAR
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
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Table 7: List of tax treaties concluded by Hong Kong
Country
1. Belgium
2. Thailand
3. Vietnam
4. Brunei
5. Netherlands
6. Indonesia
7. Hungary
8. Kuwait
9. Austria
10. United Kingdom
11. Ireland
12. Liechtenstein
13. France
14. Japan
15. Luxembourg
16. New Zealand
17. Switzerland
18. Malta
19. Spain
20. Czech Republic
21. Portugal
22. Malaysia
23. Mexico

Year of conclusion
2003
2005
2008
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011
2011
2012
2012

Table 8: Source-country taxation of passive income under selected Hong Kong tax treaties
Treaty partner
Dividends (%)
Interest (%) Royalties (%)
UN Model UN Model Article 13(5)
Article
13(4)
Mainland China
Austria
Netherlands
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
United Kingdom
Japan
France
Ireland

© IBFD

5, 10
0, 10
0, 10
0
0, 10
0, 15
5, 10
10
0

7, 0
0
0
0
0
0
10
10, 0
10, 0

7
3
3
3
3
3
5
10
3

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No

UN
Model
Article
21(3)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
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